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What degree of compliance with the Wills Act formalities should 
the courts require when analyzing whether a will has been properly 
executed? The conventional wisdom is that historically courts have 
insisted on absolute strict compliance, favoring formalities over 
testamentary intent. In 1975, Professor John Langbein argued that 
substantial compliance with the Wills Act formalities should suffice. A 
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little over a decade later, he modified his proposal, arguing for a 
harmless error approach. 
Professor Langbein’s proposals have been well received. Many 
academics have endorsed them. The Uniform Probate Code and the 
Restatement (Third) of Property have adopted his harmless error 
approach. Yet relatively few states have adopted either proposal. If 
Professor Langbein’s substantial compliance/harmless error 
proposals are so much better than strict compliance, what explains 
the failure of most jurisdictions to adopt either of them? 
This Article argues that (1) many of the states intuitively realize 
that the issue is not as simple as Professor Langbein depicts it—that 
strict compliance is neither as monolithic nor as strict as he portrays 
it; (2) most jurisdictions, in fact, do not apply the strict compliance 
approach he describes but rather a variation of it—flexible strict 
compliance; and (3) the real issue is not whether substantial 
compliance/harmless error is better than traditional strict 
compliance, but whether substantial compliance/harmless error is 
better than flexible strict compliance—and the answer to that 
question is far from obvious. Flexible strict compliance adopts a more 
pragmatic approach to the public policy considerations underlying 
the Wills Act formalities, eschewing the functional approach and 
instead favoring an approach that balances testator’s intent with 
costs of administration and the potential for fraud, resulting in an 
approach that is more efficient than either substantial compliance or 
harmless error. 
INTRODUCTION 
He who phrases the issue usually wins the debate. 
hether a document qualifies as a valid will is a function of two 
variables: (1) the Wills Act formalities (i.e., the statutory 
requirements for a valid will), and (2) how strictly the courts require a 
party to comply with the Wills Act formalities.1 Historically courts 
 
1 Peter T. Wendel, The Succession Rights of Adopted Adults: Trying to Fit a Square 
Peg into a Round Hole, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 815, 825–26 (2010); see Lawrence W. 
Waggoner, The UPC Authorizes Notarized Wills, 34 ACTEC J. 83, 83–85 (2008) 
(discussing the UPC Wills Act formalities and harmless error combination); see also Kelly 
A. Hardin, An Analysis of the Virginia Wills Act Formalities and the Need for a 
Dispensing Power Statute in Virginia, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1145, 1150–57 (1993); 
Alan Newman, Revocable Trusts and the Law of Wills: An Imperfect Fit, 43 REAL PROP. 
W 
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were rather strict in analyzing whether a party had complied with the 
Wills Act formalities.2 The Wills Act formalities are, after all, 
statutory requirements.3 If the legislature deems it appropriate to 
include a requirement in the statutory scheme, under the separation of 
powers inherent in the American legal system,4 is it appropriate for a 
court to question whether a statutory requirement is really required? If 
a court were to probate a document that was not executed in 
compliance with the jurisdiction’s Wills Act formalities, would the 
court de facto be rewriting the statute?5 That logic, in part, underlies 
the traditional strict compliance approach. If the document was not 
executed in strict compliance with the state’s Wills Act formalities, 
that was the end of the analysis: the document was not a valid will. 
Whether a will was validly executed was a question of statutory 
compliance, not testamentary intent.6 
The traditional strict compliance approach to the Wills Act 
formalities first came under attack during the 1940s.7 Critics argued it 
 
PROB. & TR. J. 523, 525 (2008) (discussing the relationship between a jurisdiction’s Wills 
Act formalities and the degree of compliance the courts require). 
2 Mark Glover, Decoupling the Law of Will-Execution, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 597, 598, 
601–04 (2014); C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative 
Reform: An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and 
the Movement Toward Amorphism, 43 FLA. L. REV. 167, 170, 177–79 (1991). 
3 Hardin, supra note 1, at 1150–54; Sean P. Milligan, The Effect of a Harmless Error in 
Executing a Will: Why Texas Should Adopt Section 2-503 of the Uniform Probate Court, 
36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 787, 792–94 (2005). 
4 It should be noted, however, that the issue of separation of powers is much more 
complex at the state level than it is at the federal level. In Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line 
Co., 211 U.S. 210, 225 (1908), Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes pointed out that the Federal 
Constitution imposes no “separation-of-powers restrictions on the states.” See G. Alan 
Tarr, Interpreting the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 329, 330 (2003). Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of states have 
constitutionalized the separation of powers doctrine by expressly including it in their 
constitutions. Id. at 337–38. 
5 See, e.g., Leigh A. Shipp, Equitable Remedies for Nonconforming Wills: New Choices 
for Probate Courts in the United States, 79 TUL. L. REV. 723, 726 (2005) (“Perhaps 
institutional conflict left courts unclear as to the source, if any, of their authority to 
disregard the express mandates of the state will statutes. Courts, as a rule, dislike the idea 
of ‘judicially rewrit[ing] the statute,’ even in cases where the defect seems innocuous.”). 
6 Admittedly, a will must have testamentary intent, so testamentary intent is part of the 
analysis, but under traditional strict compliance the primary focus was on the formalities 
associated with the Wills Act and not on whether the decedent intended the document to 
be his or her will. See Stevens v. Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610, 613 (W. Va. 1998); Glover, 
supra note 2, at 604; Miller, supra note 2, at 177–79; Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of 
Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 236, 241 (1996); James Lindgren, The Fall 
of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009, 1009 (1992). 
7 See Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine E. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 
51 YALE L.J. 1 (1941); Philip Mechem, Why Not a Modern Wills Act? A Comment on the 
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favored formalism at the expense of decedent’s intent.8 Professor 
John H. Langbein’s landmark article, Substantial Compliance with the 
Wills Act,9 forced the issue by offering an alternative to strict 
compliance. In making the case for substantial compliance, he 
portrays strict compliance as an extreme approach that always insists 
on absolute, “literal” compliance with a jurisdiction’s Wills Act 
formalities.10 Having painted strict compliance as something of a 
ruthless villain, he then offers substantial compliance as a kinder and 
gentler—and better—approach.11 Under his substantial compliance 
approach, even if a will is not strictly compliant with the applicable 
Wills Act formalities, it can still be probated, thereby saving 
decedent’s intent, so long as (1) the document expresses the 
decedent’s testamentary intent, and (2) the document’s form 
sufficiently approximates the Wills Act formality to enable the court 
to conclude that the purposes underlying the Wills Act have been 
served.12 
Professor Langbein, however, was not done. Just over a decade 
later he advocated an even more liberal approach to analyzing 
whether a defectively executed will should nevertheless be probated: 
the harmless error approach.13 His revised proposal arose out of his 
study of probate law in Australia. The state of South Australia had 
adopted a dispensing power approach that authorizes a court to 
dispense with a defective Wills Act formality so long as the court “is 
satisfied that there can be no reasonable doubt that the deceased 
intended the document to constitute his will.”14 Professor Langbein 
praised the dispensing power approach as more consistent with the 
intent-based, purposive approach he envisioned when he first 
 
Wills Provisions of the Model Probate Code, 33 IOWA L. REV. 501 (1948); see also David 
Horton, Tomorrow’s Inheritance: The Frontiers of Estate Planning Formalism, 58 B.C. L. 
REV. 539, 555–56 (2017) (recounting Gulliver and Tilson’s discussion of the pros and 
cons of the Wills Act formalities and functions). 
8 See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 7, at 2–3, 17; Horton, supra note 7, at 546; 
Mechem, supra note 7, at 503–07. 
9 John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489 
(1975). 
10 Id. at 489. 
11 Id. at 513–30. 
12 Id. at 489, 513. 
13 John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on 
Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1987). 
14 Id. at 9 (quoting section 12(2) of the new, local Wills Act, Wills Act Amendment Act 
(No. 2) of 1975, § 9 amending Wills Act of 1936, § 12(2), 8 S. Austl. Stat. 665). 
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proposed substantial compliance.15 Professor Langbein modified the 
doctrine slightly, renamed it the “harmless error” doctrine, and 
adopted it as his preferred approach.16 Under harmless error, so long 
as there is clear and convincing evidence that the document expresses 
the decedent’s testamentary intent, the court should probate the will 
despite any deficiencies in its execution.17 
By most all accounts, Professor Langbein’s intent-based approach 
has carried the day. His articles constitute the foundation for the 
prevailing academic view of the Wills Act formalities,18 and his 
harmless error proposal has been adopted as part of the Uniform 
Probate Code (UPC) and the Restatement (Third) of Property.19 The 
rush to embrace the harmless error doctrine, however, has been much 
slower at the state level. Only ten states have adopted the UPC 
provision,20 and several of them have modified it to narrow its 
scope.21 More importantly, the overwhelming majority of states have 
failed to adopt the harmless error doctrine. 
If Professor Langbein’s substantial compliance/harmless error 
proposals are so much better than strict compliance, what explains the 
failure of most jurisdictions to adopt either of them? Might it be (1) 
that many of the states intuitively realize that the issue is not as 
simple as Professor Langbein depicts it—that strict compliance is 
neither as monolithic nor as strict as he portrays it; (2) that most 
jurisdictions, in fact, do not apply the strict compliance approach that 
he describes but rather a variation of it—flexible strict compliance;22 
and (3) that the real issue is not whether substantial 
compliance/harmless error is better than traditional strict compliance, 
but whether substantial compliance/harmless error is better than 
flexible strict compliance—and the answer to that question is far from 
obvious. 
 
15 See id. at 1–2, 33–34, 51–54. 
16 Id. at 33–37, 53–54. 
17 Id. at 3–37. 
18 See Lindgren, supra note 6, at 1014 (declaring that “John Langbein has won”); see 
also infra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra note 70. 
21 See infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
22 While there are a number of different terms that could be used to describe this 
approach, “flexible strict approach” arguably fits best because it acknowledges (1) that the 
jurisdiction’s default approach is strict compliance, while at the same time acknowledging 
(2) that the courts take a “flexible approach” to applying strict compliance in that they are 
open to applying a form of substantial compliance to execution scenarios where they think 
best. See infra notes 223–55 and accompanying text. 
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Whether substantial compliance or harmless error is better than 
flexible strict compliance is particularly questionable from an 
economic perspective. Professor Langbein’s substantial compliance 
and harmless error approaches focus on “individual justice.”23 Once a 
testator puts his or her testamentary wishes in writing, the paramount 
public policy consideration is to give effect to that intent.24 Professor 
Langbein’s approaches focus solely on the outcome in a given case 
and fail to consider potential negative externalities: (1) whether the 
resulting precedent may encourage third parties to engage in future 
misconduct in the hope that they may be able to convince the court 
the latter case is indistinguishable from the prior case, and/or (2) 
whether the precedent established by the case before the court may 
result in increased future costs of administration because future 
testators may be more complacent in how they express their intent.25 
On the other hand, flexible strict compliance adopts a more pragmatic 
approach. Flexible strict compliance balances the competing public 
policy considerations of giving effect to testator’s intent while at the 
same time minimizing costs of administration and the potential for 
fraud and/or other misconduct.26 In doing so, flexible strict 
compliance focuses more on the marginal benefits of applying 
substantial compliance to a particular Wills Act formality in a given 
scenario and thus is more efficient than either substantial compliance 
or harmless error.27 
I 
PROFESSOR LANGBEIN’S PORTRAYAL OF STRICT COMPLIANCE 
A. Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act 
Professor Langbein’s first article, Substantial Compliance with the 
Wills Act, is generally credited with first asking the question of 
whether requiring strict compliance with a jurisdiction’s Wills Act is 
the best approach.28 As the title indicates, the focus of the article is on 
 
23 See infra notes 212–19 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 192–202, 216–19 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 203–29, 240–44 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 223–38, 249–55 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 203–55 and accompanying text. 
28 See Roger Andersen, Will Executions: A Modern Guide, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
57, 75 (1994); Glover, supra note 2, at 605; Stephanie Lester, Admitting Defective Wills to 
Probate, Twenty Years Later: New Evidence for the Adoption of the Harmless Error Rule, 
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offering substantial compliance as a viable alternative. It is somewhat 
understandable then that the article’s description and discussion of 
strict compliance may not be as detailed and thorough as its 
description and discussion of his substantial compliance proposal. 
Nevertheless, in retrospect his examination of the strict compliance 
approach is surprisingly conclusory. The article paints a rather 
villainous picture of strict compliance, using a broad brush and 
damning colors, but with little support. It is almost as if the article 
assumes that the reader already agrees with its position that strict 
compliance is a rigid, monolithic approach that always and needlessly 
insists on one-hundred percent compliance with the Wills Act 
formalities or the will is invalid. 
1. The Article’s Introduction 
The first two paragraphs of Professor Langbein’s Substantial 
Compliance article are an excellent example of the school of 
persuasive writing that postulates that the opening paragraphs of an 
article should overview what is to come.29 The first paragraph 
introduces the strict compliance approach, and the second paragraph 
introduces and contrasts Professor Langbein’s substantial compliance 
proposal: 
 The law of wills is notorious for its harsh and relentless 
formalism. The Wills Act prescribes a particular set of formalities 
for executing one’s testament. The most minute defect in formal 
compliance is held to void the will, no matter how abundant the 
evidence that the defect was inconsequential. Probate courts do not 
speak of harmless error in the execution of wills. To be sure, there 
is considerable diversity and contradiction in the cases interpreting 
what acts constitute compliance with what formalities. But once a 
formal defect is found, Anglo-American courts have been 
unanimous in concluding that the attempted will fails. 
 This Article contends that the insistent formalism of the law of 
wills is mistaken and needless. The thesis, stimulated in part by 
relatively recent developments that have lessened the authority of 
the Wills Act, is that the familiar concept of substantial compliance 
should now be applied to the Wills Act. The finding of a formal 
defect should lead not to automatic invalidity, but to a further 
inquiry: does the noncomplying document express the decedent’s 
testamentary intent, and does its form sufficiently approximate 
 
42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 577, 579 (2007). But see Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 7, 
and Mechem, supra note 7 (for an analysis that arguably raised the issue before Langbein). 
29 See LAUREL CURRIE OATES ET AL., THE LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK 581–84 (3d 
ed. 2002); EUGENE VOLOKH, ACADEMIC LEGAL WRITING 39–42 (3d ed. 2007). 
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Wills Act formality to enable the court to conclude that it serves the 
purposes of the Wills Act?30 
The opening paragraphs also set the tone for Professor Langbein’s 
treatment of strict compliance. The opening sentence describes the 
strict compliance approach as “notorious,” “harsh” and “relentless”—
all critical terms loaded with negative connotations. While there are 
no supporting cites for the accusations, it is only the first sentence of 
the article. The purpose of the opening paragraph is to introduce the 
reader to the article’s topic and themes. Broad, conclusory statements 
are to be expected. The assumption is that the body of the paper will 
elaborate on and prove the point.31 Having set forth the nature and 
tone of his attack on strict compliance in the opening sentence, the 
third sentence elaborates on it by noting: “The most minute defect in 
formal compliance is held to void the will, no matter how abundant 
the evidence that the defect was inconsequential.”32 The paragraph 
closes with the damning accusation: “[O]nce a formal defect is found, 
Anglo-American courts have been unanimous in concluding that the 
attempted will fails.”33 
The introductory paragraph quickly and effectively villainizes 
“literal” strict compliance as a monolithic approach to the Wills Act 
formalities, where even the slightest mistake in the will execution 
ceremony dooms the document. Decedent’s intent is sacrificed in the 
name of formalism. While at first it is unclear whether Professor 
Langbein shares this view—or whether he is simply educating the 
reader on the commonly held view of strict compliance—the second 
paragraph removes any doubt: “This Article contends that the 
insistent formalism of the law of wills is mistaken and needless. The 
thesis . . . is that the familiar concept of substantial compliance should 
now be applied to the Wills Act.”34 
Having framed the issue and set the tone in the article’s 
introduction—which is better, the “harsh and relentless” strict 
compliance approach or our “familiar friend” substantial 
 
30 See Langbein, supra note 9, at 489. 
31 An alternative explanation is that the point is so well known, and well accepted, that 
it does not need support or proof. That appears to be a weak explanation in this context. 
Because the crux of the article is that the new proposal is better than the prevailing 
approach, one would expect some support for the characterization of the prevailing strict 
compliance approach. 
32 Langbein, supra note 9, at 489 (emphasis added). 
33 Id. (emphasis added). 
34 Id. (emphasis added). 
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compliance?—one would expect the body of the article to put the 
issue under the microscope and compare and contrast the two 
approaches—to examine each in greater detail and prove the failings 
of the strict compliance approach and the benefits of the substantial 
compliance approach. But does it? 
2. The Body of the Article 
The first two subsections of the article focus on the Wills Act 
formalities, their history and their functions—not on the degree of 
compliance that should be required.35 The third subsection, 
“Formality and Formalism,” returns to the article’s focus: Should the 
courts require strict or substantial compliance with the Wills Act 
formalities?36 The opening sentence of this third section reintroduces 
literal strict compliance, once again painting it as harsh and relentless: 
“What is peculiar about the law of wills is not the prominence of the 
formalities, but the judicial insistence that any defect in complying 
with them automatically and inevitably voids the will.”37 Once again, 
however, the accusation lacks supporting citation, and he offers no 
immediate elaboration. It is, however, only the opening sentence of 
the opening paragraph of a new subsection. The opening paragraph 
typically overviews material to come. The assumption is the 
subsection will circle back around later to prove the point. The rest of 
the opening paragraph reintroduces substantial compliance, noting 
that in other areas of the law where formal statutory requirements are 
not satisfied, to prevent injustice, the courts have taken a more 
“purposive approach to formal defects” by applying substantial 
compliance.38 
Having reintroduced the contrasting approaches, the table has been 
set for a detailed examination of the pros and cons of each. The next 
paragraph, however, fails to offer any proof of “the judicial insistence 
that any defect in complying with them automatically and inevitably 
 
35 The first section of the article is “The Logic of Formalism.” The first subsection 
within that section is titled “The Wills Act Formalities.” It traces the history and basic 
provisions of the typical Wills Act. Langbein, supra note 9, at 490–91. The second 
subsection, “The Purposes of the Wills Act Formalities,” discusses the different theoretical 
explanations for why one’s testamentary intent must meet the requirements of the Wills 
Act, including a discussion of the classic functions underlying the Wills Act formalities. 
Langbein, supra note 9, at 491–98. 
36 See Langbein, supra note 9, at 498. 
37 Id. (emphasis added). 
38 Id. at 498–99 (emphasis added). 
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voids the will.”39 Instead, the rest of the subsection (1) examines the 
traditional factors that have been offered to justify why strict 
compliance is necessary in the law of wills40 and (2) analyzes whether 
these factors truly justify the harsher treatment strict compliance 
imposes on the law of wills—all without actually examining the 
harsher treatment.41 Throughout the analysis of the factors, the 
subsection repeatedly makes negative references to strict compliance 
that reinforce the image that it is harsh and relentless,42 without any 
detailed examination of the approach. 
There is minimal examination or discussion of the harsh and 
relentless nature of strict compliance in the rest of the article.43 There 
is, however, one noteworthy exception. In section III of the article, 
Professor Langbein argues that substantial compliance would neither 
increase nor decrease the amount of litigation with respect to the 
 
39 Id. at 498 (emphasis added). 
40 Id. at 499. 
41 Id. at 499–503. 
42 This is not to imply that the analysis under the law of wills is not harsher than it is 
under the statute of frauds, it is just that the article still has not examined in detail and 
proved the characterization of strict compliance that it alleges: that strict compliance is 
“harsh and relentless.” To be sure, however, the phrasing of the repeated references to the 
strict compliance approach leave the reader with the impression that there can be no other 
characterization of strict compliance. On pages 499 and 500, Professor Langbein uses the 
following phrases to describe the approach: “[j]udicial insistence on literal compliance,” 
“rigid enforcement,” “rigidly enforced,” and “construe strictly against the will.” Id. at 
499–500 (emphasis added). On page 500, he uses the following phrases: “systematic bias 
towards invalidity,” “judicial insistence on literal compliance,” and “the courts have 
denied themselves all flexibility.” Id. at 500 (emphasis added). On page 501, he uses the 
following phrases: “the rule of literal compliance,” “the rule of literal compliance inflicts 
constant and mostly uncontrollable inequity,” “the rule of literal compliance with the 
formalities,” and “[t]he rule of literal compliance with Wills Act formalities.” Id. at 501 
(emphasis added). On page 502, he uses the following phrases in discussing the approach: 
“[the resulting exclusion of evidence of the decedent’s testamentary intent is described as] 
‘an intolerable injustice’” (citation omitted), “the rule of literal compliance,” “the literal 
enforcement of the formalities,” “[t]he injustice of nonpurposive insistence on the 
formalities,” and “the injustice of their rule of literal compliance.” Id. at 502 (emphasis 
added). On page 503, he describes the approach as “a wholly mechanical rule.” Id. at 503. 
43 The rest of the article looks at the issue of substantial compliance versus strict 
compliance from more of a macro perspective. Professor Langbein points out that the 
other time of death transfer mechanisms and the 1969 Uniform Probate Code revisions to 
the Wills Act take more of a functional approach to what constitutes a valid testamentary 
transfer. See Langbein, supra note 9, at 503–12. This functional approach de facto de-
emphasizes the importance of the Wills Act formalities. Accordingly, adopting substantial 
compliance as the appropriate judicial approach to whatever Wills Act formalities remain 
would be consistent with the more functional approach applied to the rest of testamentary 
transfer law. See Langbein, supra note 9, at 513–31. 
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validity of a will.44 Rather, substantial compliance would substitute 
one type of litigation (whether there is clear and convincing evidence 
that the decedent intended the document to be his or her will) for the 
existing litigation (whether the decedent had strictly complied with 
the Wills Act formalities).45 In making the argument, the article 
returns to the harsh and relentless characterization of strict 
compliance. In particular, Professor Langbein notes: “The rule of 
literal compliance can produce results so harsh that sympathetic 
courts incline to squirm.”46 
The article then elaborates on that point by asserting that a number 
of the soft, fact-sensitive formalities have proven so problematic for 
the courts under strict compliance that the courts “have produced a 
vast, contradictory, unpredictable and sometimes dishonest case law 
in which the courts purport to find literal compliance in cases which 
in fact instance defective compliance.”47 That comment is interesting 
because it appears to contradict the article’s overall characterization 
that strict compliance is “harsh and relentless” and that “any defect in 
complying with . . . [the Wills Act formalities] automatically and 
inevitably voids the will.”48 Apparently failure to comply with the 
Wills Act formalities under strict compliance does not automatically 
and inevitably doom the decedent’s intent; some courts find a way to 
validate the will—“to find literal compliance”—despite “in fact . . . 
defective compliance.”49 Instead of examining that case law, 
however, the article summarily dismisses the cases as “contradictory, 
unpredictable and sometimes dishonest . . . .”50 
Might the apparent “contradictory, unpredictable and . . . dishonest 
case law” be evidence that the strict compliance approach is not as 
monolithic as Professor Langbein’s Substantial Compliance article 
characterizes it? Might it be possible to synthesize some of the 
contradictory case law and extract from it a different approach, a 
flexible strict compliance approach that lies somewhere between the 
harsh and relentless strict compliance described in Professor 
Langbein’s Substantial Compliance article and his substantial 
compliance proposal? Professor Langbein adamantly rejects such a 
 
44 See Langbein, supra note 9, at 524–26. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 525 (emphasis added). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 498 (emphasis added). 
49 Id. at 525. 
50 Id. 
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possibility: “In cases of defective compliance the important choice is 
between litigation resolved purposefully and honestly under the 
substantial compliance doctrine, or irrationally and sometimes 
dishonestly under the rule of literal compliance.”51 
3. Conclusion 
Professor Langbein’s Substantial Compliance article argues that 
the law of wills had only two options: maintain the status quo 
(continuing to apply the harsh and relentless strict compliance 
approach) or adopt his substantial compliance proposal. The article, 
however, never proves that assertion. Apparently the legal community 
was so interested in Professor Langbein’s substantial compliance 
proposal that it failed to critically examine his characterization of the 
state of law. 
B. Excusing Harmless Errors 
In his follow-up article, Excusing Harmless Errors in the 
Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in 
Probate Law,52 Professor Langbein reexamines his substantial 
compliance proposal in light of South Australia’s experience with the 
dispensing power approach.53 The opening section of the article sets 
the analytical framework. The section’s heading says it all: “The 
Problem and the Cures.”54 Strict compliance is the problem. While 
the focus of the article is on the possible cures (substantial 
compliance versus harmless error), a quick look at the problem sets 
up the analysis.55 
Interestingly, compared to his criticism of strict compliance in the 
Substantial Compliance article, Professor Langbein’s treatment of 
strict compliance in the Harmless Errors article is markedly different. 
The rhetoric he uses is not nearly as negatively charged: “The puzzle 
about the Wills Act formalities is not why we have them, but why we 
enforce them so stringently.”56 That is as critical as the phrasing gets. 
Gone is the visceral phrasing with its accompanying negative 
 
51 Id. at 526 (emphasis added). 
52 See Langbein, supra note 13. 
53 Id. at 33–36. 
54 Id. at 2. 
55 Professor Langbein devotes only two paragraphs to the problem. See supra note 13, 
at 3–4. 
56 Langbein, supra note 13, at 3 (emphasis added). 
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connotations.57 Gone are the broadly-worded, conclusory, and 
repetitive attacks that permeated the Substantial Compliance 
discussion of strict compliance.58 Instead, the Harmless Errors article 
points out the failings of strict compliance by offering but a single 
example of what can happen under that approach: the In re 
Groffman59 case. 
Professor Langbein introduces Groffman by stating that it involves 
a “common execution blunder”60—implicitly asserting both that the 
case is (1) representative of execution blunders that occur, and (2) 
representative of the analysis and outcome that occurs under strict 
compliance. In two short paragraphs, the article presents the facts of 
the case, the court’s analysis, and Professor Langbein’s critique: 
 Each of the two witnesses, who were attending a social gathering 
at the testator’s home, took his turn signing the will in the dining 
room while the other witness was in the living room. The will was 
held invalid for violation of the requirement that the testator sign or 
acknowledge it in the presence of two witnesses present at the same 
time, although the judge forthrightly declared: “I am perfectly 
satisfied that that document was intended by the deceased to be 
executed as his will and that its contents represent his testamentary 
intentions.” The Wills Act is meant to implement the decedent’s 
intent; the paradox in a case like Groffman is that the Wills Act 
defeats that intent. What makes Groffman interesting is not the 
facts, which are commonplace, but the judge’s candor in admitting 
that his decision frustrated the decedent’s intent. 
 Must it be so? Is the rule of strict compliance the inevitable price 
for the benefits of Wills Act formality? If legal policymakers were 
put to the choice between a regime of no Wills Act formalities, on 
the one hand, versus the Wills Act as traditionally applied on the 
other hand, there would be a large consensus in favor of the status 
quo. The greatest blessing of the Wills Act formalities is the safe 
harbor that they create. Without prescribed formalities, the testator 
would be left to grope for his own means of persuading the probate 
court that his intentions were final and volitional. The testator who 
complies with Wills Act formalities assures his estate of routine 
probate in all but exceptional circumstances. In order to escape the 
rule of strict compliance with the Wills Act, therefore, the case must 
be made that the benefits of Wills Act formality would be retained 
even if the law were changed to excuse execution blunders.61 
 
57 See supra notes 30–34, 42 and accompanying text. Not once does the Harmless 
Error article use the term “harsh,” “relentless,” “literal,” or “notorious.” 
58 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
59 [1969] 1 W.L.R. 733, [1969] 2 All E.R. 108 (Q.B.). 
60 Langbein, supra note 13, at 3 (emphasis added). 
61 Langbein, supra note 13, at 3–4 (emphasis added). 
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By using Groffman as a foil to set up his discussion of the 
substantial compliance and harmless error doctrines, Professor 
Langbein deftly makes his point: “The Wills Act is meant to 
implement the decedent’s intent; the paradox in a case like Groffman 
is that the Wills Act defeats that intent.”62 Obviously, however, it is 
not the Wills Act, per se, that defeats the decedent’s intent, it is the 
traditional strict compliance approach to the Wills Act. 
There is very little additional discussion of strict compliance in the 
Excusing Harmless Errors article, and when there is, it is in passing 
and without the charged language used in the Substantial Compliance 
article. While the tone of the strict compliance discussion is softer, 
Professor Langbein implicitly makes his point that it is harsh and 
relentless: 
 [U]nder the rule of strict compliance, so long as some formalities 
remain, the least error in complying with any of them still 
invalidates the will . . . . [A] legal system should be able to preserve 
relatively high levels of formality, in order to enhance the safe 
harbor that is created for the careful testator who complies fully, 
without having to invalidate every will in which the testator does 
not reach the harbor.63 
As in the Substantial Compliance article, however, the 
characterization of strict compliance in the Harmless Error article as 
absolute and unforgiving is based on minimal evidence and support. 
C. Professor Langbein’s Proposals—Epilogue 
1. Academic Response 
Professor Langbein’s Substantial Compliance and Harmless Errors 
articles ignited a flurry of scholarly activity. Academically, one would 
be hard-pressed to name a probate topic that has generated more legal 
scholarship in the past fifty years than Professor Langbein’s two 
articles.64 The articles, and their substantial compliance and harmless 
 
62 Id. at 4. 
63 Id. at 5–6 (emphasis added). 
64 A list of articles that either focus on or discuss one or both of Professor Langbein’s 
articles includes: Jane B. Baron, Irresolute Testators, Clear and Convincing Wills Law, 73 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2016); Meridith H. Bogart, State Doctrines of Substantial 
Compliance: A Call for ERISA Preemption and Uniform Federal Common Law Doctrine, 
25 CARDOZO L. REV. 447 (2003); Lloyd Bonfield, Reforming the Requirements for Due 
Execution of Wills: Some Guidance from the Past, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1893 (1996); Richard 
Lewis Brown, The Holograph Problem—The Case Against Holographic Wills, 74 TENN. 
L. REV. 93 (2006); Hanna M. Chouest, Dot All ‘I’s and Cross all ‘T’s: Estate of Tamulis 
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error proposals, have been critiqued, commented on, and elaborated 
on in dozens of law review articles, and as this Article evidences, that 
analysis continues. Most of the scholarship agrees with Professor 
Langbein that substantial compliance and harmless error are better 
approaches than the traditional strict compliance approach.65 His 
intent-based approach to the Wills Act formalities has become the 
conventional wisdom within the academic community of the Wills 
Act formalities. 
2. Normative Law Response 
Professor Langbein’s harmless error proposal has also enjoyed 
great success at the normative level. In 1990, The Uniform Law 
Commission adopted the harmless error approach as part of the 
 
v. Commissioner and the Narrowing of the Substantial Compliance Doctrine to the 
Technical Compliance Doctrine, 62 TAX LAW. 259 (2008); Mary Louise Fellows & 
Gregory S. Alexander, Forty Years of Codification of Estates and Trusts Law: Lessons for 
the Next Generation, 40. GA. L. REV. 1049 (2006); Samuel Flaks, Excusing Harmless 
Error in Will Execution: The Israeli Experience, 3 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 
27 (2010); David Horton, Tomorrow’s Inheritance: The Frontiers of Estate Planning 
Formalism, 58 B.C. L. REV. 539 (2017); Katheleen R. Guzman, Where Strict Meets 
Substantial: Oklahoma Standards for the Execution of a Will, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 543 
(2014); Dan W. Holbrook, Questionable Will Executions: Should ‘Substantial 
Compliance’ Suffice?, 48 TENN. B.J. 28 (2012); Warren Gorham Lamont & Ronald R. 
Volkmer, Substantial Compliance and Will Execution, 18 EST. PLAN. 376 (1991); James 
Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009 (1992); Bruce H. Mann, 
Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 
(1994); Stephanie Lester, Admitting Defective Wills to Probate, Twenty Years Later: New 
Evidence for the Adoption of the Harmless Error Rule, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 577 
(2007); C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: 
An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and the 
Movement Toward Amorphism, 43 FLA. L. REV. 599 (1991); Sean P. Milligan, The Effect 
of a Harmless Error in Executing a Will: Why Texas Should Adopt Section 2-503 of the 
Uniform Probate Court, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 787 (2005); John V. Orth, Wills Act 
Formalities: How Much Compliance is Enough?, 43 REAL PROP. TRUST & EST. L.J. 73 
(2008); Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The 
Search for a Compromise Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 
453 (2002); Leigh A. Shipp, Equitable Remedies for Nonconforming Wills: New Choices 
for Probate Courts in the United States, 79 TUL. L. REV. 723 (2005); Eddy R. Smith, 
Strictly Speaking, When is a Will not a Will?, 51 TENN. B.J. 30 (2015); Ronald R. 
Volkmer, Will Execution and Substantial Compliance, 41 EST. PLAN. 40 (2014). 
65 A number of the articles make the case for why a particular jurisdiction should adopt 
one of the two approaches. See, e.g., Katheleen R. Guzman, Where Strict Meets 
Substantial: Oklahoma Standards for the Execution of a Will, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 543 
(2014); Kelly A. Hardin, An Analysis of the Virginia Wills Act Formalities and the Need 
for a Dispensing Power Statute in Virginia, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1145 (1993); Sean 
P. Milligan, The Effect of a Harmless Error in Executing a Will: Why Texas Should Adopt 
Section 2-503 of the Uniform Probate Court, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 787 (2005). 
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Uniform Probate Code (UPC).66 Section 2-503 of the UPC provides 
that a document that is not executed in compliance with a state’s 
Wills Act formalities can nevertheless be probated as the decedent’s 
will so long as “the proponent of the document or writing establishes 
by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the 
document or writing to constitute . . . the decedent’s will . . . .”67 The 
Restatement (Third) of Property has also adopted Professor 
Langbein’s harmless error approach: “A harmless error in executing a 
will may be excused if the proponent establishes by clear and 
convincing evidence that the decedent adopted the document as his or 
her will.”68 
3. Positive Law Response 
The rush to embrace substantial compliance and harmless error has 
been significantly slower at the positive law level. Judicially, to date, 
the only appellate court to expressly adopt Professor Langbein’s 
substantial compliance approach is the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
In re Will of Ranney.69 Statutorily, only ten states have adopted the 
UPC’s harmless error provision (one being New Jersey),70 and 
several of these states have revised the doctrine so that it can be 
applied only under more limited, statutorily defined conditions.71 
Interestingly, the vast majority of the states have failed to adopt either 
 
66 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (2010) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 215 (2013 & Supp. 
2014). 
67 Id. 
68 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 
(AM. LAW INST. 1999). 
69 589 A.2d 1339 (N.J. 1991). A Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, a trial court, 
adopted Professor Langbein’s substantial compliance approach in Estate of Kajut, 22 Pa. 
D. & C.3d 123, 136 (C.P. 1981). 
70 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110(c)(2) (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-503 (2013); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-503 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2503 (2002); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523 (2007); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (2012); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 112.238 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-503 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
75-2-503 (2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-404 (2013). 
71 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110(c)(2) (2010) (limiting the harmless error doctrine to 
execution defects related to the witnessing requirements and not permitting it to be applied 
to defects related to the signature requirement); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-503(2) (2013) 
(limiting Colorado’s harmless error doctrine to documents “signed or acknowledged by the 
decedent as his or her will or if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the 
decedent erroneously signed a document intended to be the will of the decedent’s 
spouse”); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-404(B) (2013) (providing that Virginia’s harmless error 
doctrine “may not be used to excuse compliance with any requirement for a testator’s 
signature,” except in very limited, statutorily defined circumstances). 
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Professor Langbein’s substantial compliance or harmless error 
proposals, apparently preferring to stick with strict compliance. 
If the benefits of Professor Langbein’s substantial 
compliance/harmless errors proposals are so obvious, and if the 
traditional approach to strict compliance is so harsh and relentless, 
what explains the failure of most jurisdictions to adopt either of these 
approaches? Might it be that things are not as they seem? 
II 
STRICT COMPLIANCE—IS IT REALLY THAT HARSH AND 
RELENTLESS? 
Professor Langbein’s Substantial Compliance article repeatedly 
characterizes traditional strict compliance approach as harsh and 
relentless.72 While the criticism of traditional strict compliance in his 
Harmless Error article is less visceral, he still makes the point that 
traditional strict compliance sacrifices decedent’s intent in favor of 
formalism.73 He concludes his analysis of Groffman by asking the 
simple rhetorical question: “Must it be so?”74 While the phrasing and 
analysis implies that under strict compliance the answer must always 
be yes, an examination of the case law shows that the answer might 
not be that simple. 
A. Groffman Revisited 
While the Groffman case can be used to demonstrate the failings of 
traditional strict compliance,75 when juxtaposed with other case law 
addressing the same issue, it can also be used to demonstrate that 
strict compliance might be more complicated than Professor Langbein 
portrays it. 
1. The Facts 
Mr. Groffman’s attorney prepared his will,76 but instead of 
executing it at his attorney’s office, he opted to execute it at a friend’s 
house during an evening of socializing. The court described the 
execution ceremony as follows: 
 
72 See supra notes 30–46 and accompanying text. 
73 See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
74 Langbein, supra note 13, at 4 (emphasis added). 
75 See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
76 In re Groffman, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 733 [1969] 2 All E.R. 108 (Q.B.). 
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 During the course of the evening, when the coffee table, the only 
available table, was laden with coffee cups and cakes, the deceased 
said words to this effect, which he addressed to Mr. David Block 
and Mr. Julius Leigh: “I should like you now to witness my will.” I 
think he may well have gestured towards his coat. The will in 
question as engrossed was of the usual double foolscap folded in 
two and then in four, so as to be a convenient size for putting in an 
inside pocket of a coat. That is where it was on this occasion. 
However, it was not taken out by the deceased in the lounge. At the 
most, he gestured towards the pocket where it was. There seems to 
me to be an overwhelming inference that his signature was on the 
document at that time. There being no convenient space for the 
execution in the lounge, Mr. Block led the deceased into the 
adjacent dining room. That was just across a small hall. There the 
deceased took the document from his pocket, unfolded it, and asked 
Mr. Block to sign, giving his occupation and address. The signature, 
as I have already said, was on the document at the time and was 
visible to Mr. Block at the time; indeed, he noted this. Mr. Leigh, 
who seems to have been somewhat cumbrous in his movements, 
was left behind. He was not there when Mr. Block signed his name. 
Mr. Block then returned to the lounge, leaving the deceased in the 
dining room. He said to Mr. Leigh words to this effect: “It is your 
turn now, don’t keep him waiting, it’s cold in there.” Mr. Leigh then 
went into the dining room and, according to his statement, and as is 
indeed borne out by the form of the document that we now have, 
signed his name beneath that of Mr. David Block. In the meantime, 
Mr. Block had remained in the lounge.77 
The applicable Wills Act provided that the testator’s “signature 
shall be made or acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two 
or more witnesses present at the same time . . . .”78 The issues were 
whether Mr. Groffman acknowledged the will in the presence of both 
witnesses and what constituted presence for purposes of the Wills 
Act? 
2. The Court’s Analysis 
The court acknowledged this was not the first time a court had 
been called upon to construe the presence requirement: 
 The matter has been considered by a number of eminent judges, 
starting with Dr. Lushington, and followed by the members of the 
Court of Appeal in Blake v. Blake (1882) 7 P.D. 102 and Daintree 
v. Butcher and Fasulo (1888) 13 P.D. 102 . . . . It seems to me that 
the authorities establish that the signature of the testator must be on 
the document at the time of acknowledgment (as I think it was), and 
 
77 Id. at 737. 
78 Id.  
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that the witnesses saw or had an opportunity of seeing the signature 
at that time, in other words, at the time of acknowledgment.79 
This approach to the presence requirement is commonly known as 
the line of sight test.80 Applying the line of sight test, the court 
concluded that Mr. Leigh was still in the lounge when the decedent 
acknowledged his signature to Mr. Block in the dining room, and Mr. 
Block was back in the lounge when the decedent acknowledged his 
signature to Mr. Leigh in the dining room. The witnesses did not see 
nor did they have the opportunity to see signature at the same time.81 
Accordingly, the will was not validly executed. 
Striking down the will in the Groffman case does seem like a harsh 
result, and thus it appears to be a good case to use to question the 
wisdom of strict compliance—if the case is truly representative of the 
strict compliance approach: But is it? Contrast Groffman with the 
American case of In re Demaris’ Estate.82 
B. In re Demaris’ Estate 
1. The Facts 
George Demaris went to Dr. Gillis’ office suffering from extreme 
abdominal pain.83 He was taken into the treatment room where he 
was placed on a cot.84 Having been informed that he needed 
immediate surgery, and fearing the worst, Demaris asked Dr. Gillis to 
draft a will for him.85 Dr. Gillis left the treatment room, and went 
across the waiting room to the consultation room where he typed up 
Demaris’ testamentary wishes.86 Dr. Gillis then returned to the 
treatment room where his wife, a registered nurse, was caring for 
 
79 Id. at 738 (emphasis added). 
80 See Andersen, supra note 28, at 64–67. 
81 In re Groffman, 1 W.L.R. at 739. 
82 110 P.2d 571 (Or. 1941). 
83 Id. at 573–74. Dr. Gillis’ office consisted of a suite of three offices: a waiting room 
in the middle (the waiting room was approximately eleven feet across and nine feet from 
front to back), a consultation room to the left of the waiting room (the consultation room 
was approximately nine feet by nine feet), and a treatment room to the right of waiting 
room (the treatment room was also approximately nine feet by nine feet). Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 474–75. 
86 Id. at 575. 
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Demaris.87 Demaris signed the document in the presence of the two 
witnesses: Dr. Gillis and his wife.88 
Dr. Gillis and his wife then took the will back across the waiting 
room to a desk in the consultation room where they signed the will.89 
The Oregon Supreme Court quoted the circuit court’s findings 
concerning that part of the execution ceremony: 
 [T]he doctor signed his name as a witness and requested Mrs. 
Gillis to sign her name as a witness, which she did; that from the 
point where Mrs. Gillis stood in front of the desk Mrs. Gillis was 
able to look through the door and see the patient, and that she was 
watching him because of his condition; that Dr. Gillis subscribed 
his name as a witness while sitting in a chair on the left side of the 
desk and could not see or be seen by the testator while actually 
witnessing the document; that while witnessing the document Dr. 
Gillis was directly in front of his wife across the table who could 
see the testator as well as the doctor; that George Demaris could 
have seen the witness Mrs. Gillis sign when she signed if he had 
looked; that he could not have seen Dr. Gillis sign; that the testator 
knew that Dr. Gillis had signed the Will as a witness, and some 
days later determined that Mrs. Gillis had signed the Will as a 
witness . . . .90 
The facts of the case, the terms of the Oregon Wills Act, and the 
admissions of the parties reduced the case to a rather simple issue: 
whether “the attesters [had] signed ‘in the presence of the testator.’”91 
As in Groffman, the Court was called upon to construe what 
constitutes “presence” for purposes of the Wills Act formalities. 
2. The Court’s Analysis 
Given the line of sight test applied in Groffman,92 and the rather 
absolutist and extreme terms which the Substantial Compliance and 
 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 575. Demaris became violently sick while writing his signature and Mrs. Gillis 
had to leave the room to get some towels, but the Court concluded that Demaris had 
properly signed the will in the presence of two witnesses present at the same time. Id. at 
575–76. 
89 Id. at 575. 
90 Id. (emphasis added). 
91 Id. at 580. The presence requirement at issue in Demaris is the requirement that the 
witnesses must be in the testator’s presence when they sign the will, as opposed to the 
presence requirement in Groffman (that the testator must be in the witnesses’ presence 
when the testator signs the will). Presence, however, arguably is presence. Both presence 
requirements arguably should be the same for purposes of the Wills Act formalities. 
92 See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
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Harmless Error articles use to describe the traditional strict 
compliance approach to the Wills Act formalities,93 one would expect 
the Demaris case to be another example of formalism over intent. The 
Oregon Wills Act required that the witnesses sign the will “in the 
presence of the testator.”94 Under the line of sight test, the presence 
formality requires that the party must be capable of seeing the act 
being performed, at the time it is performed, if he or she were to 
look.95 In Demaris, the trial court found that the testator could not 
have seen one of the witnesses, Dr. Gillis, sign the will.96 
Accordingly, the witnesses did not sign in the presence of the testator. 
Yet the Oregon Supreme Court held the document was validly 
executed and ordered the will probated.97 In contrast to the monolithic 
approach to strict compliance portrayed by Professor Langbein, the 
Oregon Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the judicial 
approach to the presence requirement varies greatly: “The meaning of 
the phrase ‘in the presence of the testator’ has been the subject of 
much controversy and of diversity of opinion. Decisions directly 
opposite to one another can be readily found.”98 On the one hand, 
there is the line of sight approach—the approach applied by the court 
in Groffman and which the Oregon Supreme Court calls the “strict 
interpretation” approach.99 On the other hand, there is what the Court 
expressly calls a more “liberal” approach100 known as the “conscious 
presence” approach.101 
The Court’s discussion of the conscious presence approach is 
particularly interesting because it parallels the arguments Professor 
Langbein invokes in support of his substantial compliance/harmless 
error approach: 
 Other courts adopt a liberal point of view. They speak of the 
circumstances of the individual case and of the purpose of the 
statute . . . . 
 [As] stated in Healey v. Bartlett, 73 N.H. 110, 59 A. 617, 618, 6 
Ann.Cas. 413: . . . “It is not necessary that he should actually see 
the witnesses, for them to be in his presence. They are in his 
 
93 See, e.g., supra notes 30–34, 42 and accompanying text. 
94 110 P.2d at 580. 
95 See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
96 110 P.2d at 579. 
97 Id. at 588. 
98 Id. at 580 (emphasis added). 
99 Id. at 580–81. 
100 Id. at 581. 
101 See Andersen, supra note 28, at 64–67. 
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presence whenever they are so near him that he is conscious of 
where they are and of what they are doing, through any of his 
senses, and are where he can readily see them if he is so disposed    
. . . .” 
 We quote from [Sturdivant] further: “While it is the duty of the 
court to observe carefully the spirit and intent of the statute, they 
will not adopt a strained and technical construction to defeat a will 
where the capacity and intention is plain, and where, by fair and 
reasonable intendment, the statute may be held to have been 
complied with, and such is the case here . . . .” 
 The court [in the Sturdivant case], in sustaining the attestation,    
. . . said: “I agree that it is not competent for the court to adopt 
another and different mode of attestation than that directed by the 
statute” but pointed out that literal compliance with the statute was 
not necessary. Substantial compliance, so it said, sufficed. It 
believed that recognition and acknowledgment of their signatures 
by the attesters constituted a part of the res gestae of the will’s 
execution. It declared that all that was done constituted one 
transaction. The decision further said: “Upon the whole, I think 
there has been a reasonable and substantial, if not a literal, 
compliance with the requisites of the statute shown in this case, 
sufficient for all practical purposes. To reject the will in such a case 
would be, as I think, to sacrifice substance to form, and the ends of 
justice to the means by which they are to be accomplished.”102 
After reviewing leading opinions on both sides of the issue, the 
Court reaffirms its support for the more liberal, substantial 
compliance based conscious presence approach, applies it to the facts 
of the case, finds that Demaris “was conscious of the attestation when 
it took place” and upholds the circuit court’s order sustaining the 
will.103 
In light of the conscious presence approach to the presence 
requirement, and based on the Court’s express reference to substantial 
compliance as opposed to literal compliance, might it be that strict 
compliance is not as harsh and relentless as one might think from 
Professor Langbein’s articles?104 
 
102 110 P.2d at 581–82 (emphasis added). 
103 Id. at 548–87. The conscious presence test adopted and applied by the Court in 
Demaris is a far cry from the line of sight test applied by the court in Groffman. In fact, a 
good faith argument can be made that the Groffman case would come out differently under 
the conscious presence test and the will would have been upheld. 
104 Or, might it be that the Demaris case is simply an example of the case law that 
Professor Langbein dismissed when he noted that a number of the soft, fact-sensitive 
formalities have proved problematic for the courts under strict compliance—so 
problematic that the courts “have produced a vast, contradictory, unpredictable and 
sometimes dishonest case law in which the courts purport to find literal compliance in 
cases which in fact instance defective compliance”? See Langbein, supra note 9, at 525; 
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C. The Ranney Case 
Additional support for the view that strict compliance is not as 
harsh and relentless as Professor Langbein’s articles imply can be 
found in the case of In re Will of Ranney.105 That statement may seem 
odd to those who are familiar with the Ranney case, as it is a 
landmark case commonly cited as the first case to adopt Professor 
Langbein’s substantial compliance proposal.106 Yet a careful reading 
of the opinion shows that it can also be used to question Professor 
Langbein’s characterization of the underlying issue. 
1. The Court’s Opinion 
Russell Ranney, the testator, signed page four of his will in the 
presence of two witnesses, but the witnesses signed page five of the 
document—the self-proving affidavit—and no other page of the 
document.107 The issue was whether the witnesses had signed the will 
as required by the Wills Act.108 In its initial analysis of the issue, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court expressly phrased the issue as “whether 
Russell’s will literally complies with the requirements of [the New 
Jersey Wills Act].”109 Applying the traditional strict compliance 
approach the Court concluded that the self-proving affidavit 
technically is not a part of the will and thus the will was not properly 
executed.110 The Court, however, went on to adopt Professor 
Langbein’s substantial compliance approach and ordered the will 
probated under it.111 
During the course of its literal strict compliance analysis, the Court 
acknowledged that several other courts had upheld a will executed 
under similar circumstances: 
 The rationale of those cases is that a self-proving affidavit and 
an attestation clause are sufficiently similar to justify the conclusion 
that signatures on a self-proving affidavit, like signatures on the 
 
see also Langbein, supra note 13, at 27–28. For further discussion of this possible 
explanation, see infra notes 120–31 and accompanying text. 
105 589 A.2d 1339 (N.J. 1991). 
106 See Lindgren, supra note 6, at 1015; Lester, supra note 28, at 601. 
107 See supra notes 77–85 and accompanying text. 
108 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
109 589 A.2d at 1342 (emphasis added). The court’s use of the phrase “literally 
complies” is particularly interesting because it harkens back to and adopts the phrasing 
used by Professor Langbein in his Substantial Compliance article approach to describe the 
traditional approach. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
110 589 A.2d at 1342–43. 
111 Id. at 1343–46. 
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attestation clause, satisfy the requirement that the signatures be on 
the will. See In re Estate of Charry, 359 So. 2d 544, 545 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1978) (witnesses’ signatures on self-proving affidavit on 
same page as testator’s signature satisfied attestation requirements); 
In re Estate of Petty, 227 Kan. 697, 702-03, 608 P.2d 987, 992-93 
(1980) (self-proving affidavit on same page as testator’s signature 
substantially complies with attestation requirements); In re 
Cutsinger, 445 P.2d 778, 782 (Okla. 1968) (self-proving affidavit 
executed on same page as testator’s signature is an attestation clause 
in substantial compliance with statutory requirement); see also In re 
Will of Leitstein, 46 Misc. 2d 656, 657, 260 N.Y.S.2d 406, 407-08 
(Sur. 1965) (probating will when witnesses signed affidavit 
purporting to be attestation clause).112 
At the time of each of the respective opinions, each of the 
respective jurisdictions was a strict compliance jurisdiction, yet the 
courts found a way to uphold the will. 
In Ranney, the New Jersey Supreme Court took the position that 
where the witnesses sign the self-proving affidavit paragraph rather 
than the will, under strict compliance, the will must be declared 
invalid. But if one were to ask, “Must it be so?” apparently the 
answer is no; four other strict compliance jurisdictions found a way to 
probate the will. 
2. The Inconsistent Case Law 
The question of law involved in Ranney, and the four inconsistent 
cases, is whether the witnesses had signed the will as required by the 
Wills Act.113 The execution blunder in each case is that the witnesses 
signed the self-proving affidavit clause, believing they were signing 
the will, but they did not otherwise sign the will.114 In comparing and 
contrasting the courts’ analysis, it is apparent that, like the courts’ 
analysis of the presence requirement, the courts’ analysis of the 
requirement that the witnesses sign the will varies greatly in this 
scenario. 
On the one hand, there is the literal strict compliance approach the 
New Jersey Supreme Court initially applied in Ranney: “We are 
 
112 Id. at 1342. 
113 In re Estate of Charry, 359 So. 2d 544, 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); In re Estate of 
Petty, 608 P.2d 987, 992–93 (Kan. 1980); In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d at 1339; In re 
Will of Leitstein, 46 Misc. 2d 656, 656–67 (Sur. Ct. 1965); In re Estate of Cutsinger, 445 
P.2d 778, 781 (Okla. 1968). 
114 In re Estate of Charry, 359 So. 2d at 544–45; In re Estate of Petty, 608 P.2d at 992–
93; In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d at 1340; In re Will of Leitstein, 46 Misc. 2d at 656–67; 
In re Estate of Cutsinger, 445 P.2d at 781. 
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unable to conclude that a will containing the signatures of witnesses 
only on such an affidavit literally complies with the attestation 
requirements of N.J.S.A. 3B:3-2.”115 The Court’s initial analysis is 
consistent with and supports Professor Langbein’s characterization of 
strict compliance. 
On the other hand, the analysis adopted by the four courts that 
upheld the will under these circumstances reflects a more liberal, a 
more purposive, and a more intent-based approach. In at least two of 
the cases the will contestants brought to the court’s attention Texas 
case law that applied literal strict compliance and held the will had 
not been properly executed.116 Nevertheless, the courts expressly 
rejected the strict compliance approach. Instead, the courts adopted 
and applied a more liberal, more intent-based approach that some of 
the courts expressly acknowledged constituted a substantial 
compliance approach. The Oklahoma Supreme Court wrote: “[W]e 
hold that the attestation of the will involved here was in substantial 
compliance with the provisions of [the Oklahoma Wills Act] 
False.”117 The Kansas Supreme Court stated, “It has been the policy 
of this court to uphold wills if the form of the will substantially 
complies with the requirements of the statute.”118 A third court, the 
Florida Court of Appeals, did not use the phrase substantial 
compliance, but its phrasing de facto acknowledges a more liberal 
approach: “The Texas view places form above substance and we 
decline to follow it.”119 
Based on Professor Langbein’s characterization of the state of the 
law of wills in his Substantial Compliance and Harmless Errors 
articles, New York, Oklahoma, Florida, and Kansas would all be 
considered strict compliance jurisdictions. Yet the judicial opinions in 
In re Estate of Charry, In re Estate of Petty, In the Matter of the 
Estate of Cutsinger, and In re Will of Leitstein, are anything but literal 
strict compliance. Might it be that the issue of what degree of 
compliance the courts should require with the Wills Act is not as 
simple as Professor Langbein’s articles depict? Might it be that strict 
 
115 In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d at 1342 (emphasis added). The Court goes on to 
repeat its conclusion and again uses the same phrase: “Consequently, the signatures of the 
witnesses on the subject self-proving affidavit do not literally comply with the statutory 
requirements.” Id. at 1343. 
116 In re Estate of Charry, 359 So. 2d at 544–45; In re Estate of Cutsinger, 445 P.2d at 
782. 
117 In re Estate of Cutsinger, 445 P.2d at 782 (emphasis added). 
118 In re Estate of Petty, 608 P.2d at 992–93 (emphasis added). 
119 In re Estate of Charry, 359 So. 2d at 545. 
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compliance is not as strict, nor as harsh and relentless, as Professor 
Langbein’s articles portray it? 
D. Professor Langbein’s Articles Revisited 
At first blush it might seem odd that Professor Langbein did not 
acknowledge and analyze this inconsistent case law—case law that is 
clearly inconsistent with his overall characterization of how strictly 
the courts interpret and apply the Wills Act formalities. Upon further 
review, however, it becomes apparent that he did, in fact, 
acknowledge the inconsistent case law. He just did it so quickly, and 
so dismissively, that one could almost be excused for overlooking it. 
In his Substantial Compliance article, Professor Langbein notes 
that a number of the soft, fact-sensitive formalities have proved 
problematic for the courts under strict compliance, so problematic that 
the courts “have produced a vast, contradictory, unpredictable and 
sometimes dishonest case law in which the courts purport to find 
literal compliance in cases which in fact instance defective 
compliance.”120 The exact case law to which Professor Langbein is 
referring is unclear, but when the inconsistent case law above is 
juxtaposed with his overall description of how the courts interpret and 
apply the Wills Act formalities, one could only assume that his 
criticism applies to this inconsistent case law. Professor Langbein 
confirms this assumption, at least with respect to the conscious 
presence doctrine, in his Harmless Error article: 
 I have a particular reason for wanting an American readership to 
pause over these cases [a number of Australian cases he has just 
analyzed under the harmless error doctrine], even though the genre 
falls outside our familiar set of recurrent Wills Act execution 
blunders. I think these cases illustrate one of the great advantages of 
a barmless [sic] error rule: its tendency to displace sleight-of-hand 
and to promote candor. When I first wrote in 1975 about the likely 
consequences of a harmless error rule, I pointed out that the 
traditional strict compliance rule tended to drive sympathetic courts 
into strained interpretations of what constituted compliance with the 
relevant formality. In a presence case like Groffman, for example, 
where each witness was in the next room while the other attested, 
most courts invalidate the will. But not all. Some courts have 
squirmed and used the fiction of “conscious presence” to conclude 
that since the two witnesses were close enough for each other and 
for the testator to be conscious of their presence, their conduct 
satisfied the strict compliance standard. The trouble with such tricks 
 
120 See Langbein, supra note 9, at 525. 
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is that it is so hard to predict whether the equities in a particular 
case will prove sufficiently appealing to inspire the court to indulge 
in the pretense.121 
It seems probable that Professor Langbein would likewise dismiss 
the opinions in In re Estate of Charry, In re Estate of Petty, In the 
Matter of the Estate of Cutsinger, and In re Will of Leitstein as more 
squirming by the courts to avoid the inequitable results imposed by 
literal strict compliance. 
Professor Langbein’s treatment of the inconsistent case law is 
interesting for several reasons. First and foremost, his description of 
the inconsistent case law is questionable. In the Substantial 
Compliance article, he summarily dismisses the case law with the 
following damning comment: “the courts purport to find literal 
compliance in cases which in fact instance defective compliance.”122 
In the Harmless Errors article he describes the conscious presence 
doctrine as a “fiction” that the courts use to find that the conduct in 
question “satisfied the strict compliance standard.”123 
That is an overly simplistic, if not out-right flawed, description of 
the inconsistent case law. In Demaris the Oregon Supreme Court 
performed a thorough and detailed analysis of the issue. In doing so, 
the Court expressly acknowledged (1) the split in the case law;124 (2) 
that the line of sight approach constituted the literal/strict compliance 
approach;125 and (3) that it was rejecting literal compliance in favor 
of substantial compliance—a more liberal, more purposive, more 
intent-based approach.126 The Oregon Supreme Court does not 
purport to require literal compliance, nor does the Court purport to 
find literal compliance. The Court openly adopts a more liberal 
approach to the Wills Act formality: the court-created substantial 
compliance approach commonly known as the conscious presence 
doctrine.127 The Court applies that approach and finds that the 
 
121 Langbein, supra note 13, at 27–28 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
122 Langbein, supra note 9, at 525 (emphasis added). 
123 Langbein, supra note 13, at 28 (emphasis added). 
124 In re Demaris’ Estate, 110 P.2d 571 (Or. 1941). 
125 Id. at 580–81. 
126 Id. at 581–87. 
127 Id. at 66 (referencing Sturdivant v. Birchett, 51 Va. 67 (1853)). The literal, strict 
compliance approach was brought to the court’s attention. See supra note 116 and 
accompanying text. The courts rejected the literal strict compliance approach. See supra 
notes 116–19 and accompanying text. Professor Langbein’s derogatory description and 
summary dismissal of the “contradictory, unpredictable and sometimes dishonest case 
law” is also interesting because the opinions adopt many of the same philosophical 
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execution ceremony sufficiently satisfied the Wills Act. The same can 
be said of the four opinions that upheld the will where the witnesses 
signed the self-proving affidavit rather than the attestation clause. The 
courts did not purport to find literal compliance; they expressly 
rejected the strict compliance approach as exalting form over 
substance.128 Instead the courts expressly acknowledged (1) they 
were adopting more of a substantial compliance approach, and (2) 
that the witnesses had substantially complied with the Wills Act 
formality by signing the self-proving affidavit.129 
Professor Langbein’s flawed description of the inconsistent case 
law is also important because it calls into question his overall 
description of the state of the law with respect to how strictly the 
courts insist on compliance with the Wills Act formalities. Professor 
Langbein’s analysis of the issue assumes there were only two possible 
approaches: (1) traditional, literal/strict compliance, or (2) his 
substantial compliance approach. By summarily dismissing the 
inconsistent case law as “contradictory, unpredictable and sometimes 
dishonest case law”130 Professor Langbein fails to consider whether 
the inconsistent case law might be evidence of yet a third approach, 
an approach that lies somewhere between traditional strict compliance 
and his proposed substantial compliance approach.131 
 
arguments that Professor Langbein invokes in favor of his substantial compliance 
approach. 
128 See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text. 
129 See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text. 
130 Langbein, supra note 9, at 525. 
131 As a curative doctrine, substantial compliance is not limited to the Wills Act. 
Substantial compliance can be—and has been—applied to a plethora of rules, including 
the Statute of Frauds (e.g., 2 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 366–82, 
420–43 (1950)); state contractor licensing requirements (e.g., Lawrence Jennings Imel, 
Substantial Compliance with the Contractors’ State License Law: An Equitable Doctrine 
Producing Inequitable Results, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1539, 1545–1555 (2001); tax law 
valuation elections (e.g., Victoria A. Levin, The Substantial Compliance Doctrine in Tax 
Law: Equity vs. Efficiency, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1587 (1993); government contracts (e.g., 
William H. Venema, Substantial Compliance in Fixed-Price Supply Contracts: A Call for 
Commercial Reasonableness, 17 PUB. CONT. L.J. 187, 191–208 (1987); the rules of civil 
procedure (e.g., 71 C.J.S. Pleading § 95 (2017)); mechanic’s liens (e.g., Grant v. Davis (In 
re CJW Ltd.), 172 B.R. 675, 684 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994); absentee voting requirements 
(e.g., William T. McCauley, Florida Absentee Voter Fraud: Fashioning an Appropriate 
Judicial Remedy, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 636 (2000); insurance contract change of 
beneficiary compliance (e.g., Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Bernardo, 683 F. 
Supp. 2d 344, 352 (E.D. Pa. 2010); ERISA change of beneficiary compliance (e.g., 
Meridith H. Bogart, State Doctrines of Substantial Compliance: A Call for ERISA 
Preemption and Uniform Federal Common Law Doctrine, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 447, 
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E. Other Evidence of a Possible Third Approach? 
Asking whether the conscious presence doctrine and the case law 
upholding a will where the witnesses sign the self-proving affidavit 
rather than the will constitute a possible third approach to the issue of 
Wills Act compliance, admittedly, is a bit of a stretch. One doctrine 
and a handful of cases hardly constitute an approach, but it is enough 
to ask whether there might be other evidence—other case law—that is 
consistent with this third approach. Is there other case law where the 
courts (1) reject literal strict compliance (either expressly or 
implicitly), and (2) adopt a substantial compliance approach (either 
expressly or implicitly) to the Wills Act formality in question? When 
viewed from that analytical perspective, the perspective of asking 
whether the case law might be evidence of a formality based, court-
created substantial compliance approach, the amount of case law 
supporting such an approach is surprising. 
 
469–73 (2003); and the SEC’s Regulation D (e.g., Mark A. Sargent, The New Regulation 
D: Deregulation, Federalism and the Dynamics of Regulatory Reform, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 
225 (1990). 
 Arguing that substantial compliance should apply begs the question: What constitutes 
substantial compliance? Not surprisingly, opinions differ. Substantial compliance runs the 
gamut. As awkward as it sounds at first blush, some scholars and courts take a 
narrower/more limited/stricter view of substantial compliance, while others take a 
broader/more liberal/looser view of substantial compliance. Some scholars and courts take 
a more purposive approach to what constitutes substantive compliance, while others also 
factor in how close factually the party comes to literal compliance. Some scholars and 
courts take a single consideration approach, while others take multiple variables into 
consideration in analyzing what constitutes substantial compliance. The Michigan 
Supreme Court recently acknowledged the complexity inherent in articulating a substantial 
compliance standard: 
The scope of a statutory “substantial compliance” provision requires an analysis, 
on a case-by-case basis, of the following logically relevant factors among others: 
the overall purpose of the statute; the potential for prejudice or unfairness when 
the apparent clarity of a statutory provision is replaced by the uncertainty of a 
“substantial compliance” clause; the interests of future litigants and the public; 
the extent to which a court can reasonably determine what constitutes 
“substantial compliance” within a particular context; and, of course, the specific 
language of the “substantial compliance” and other provisions of the statute. 
Northern Concrete Pipe, Inc. v. Sinacola Companies-Midwest, Inc., 603 N.W.2d 257, 
260–61 (Mich. 1999). What the test should be for substantial compliance is far from clear 
or universally agreed upon. There are plenty of examples of other areas of law where the 
courts and scholars agree that substantial compliance should apply, but disagree over what 
the test should be. That, arguably, is the current state of affairs with respect to the Wills 
Act. The courts have developed one approach, flexible strict compliance, while Professor 
Langbein proposed a different approach. 
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1. The Requirement that the Testator Publish the Will 
Historically, although neither the English Statute of Frauds nor the 
English Wills Act required a testator to publish his or her will to the 
witnesses as part of the execution ceremony,132 many American 
jurisdictions did.133 Not surprisingly, a variety of execution scenarios 
arose where it was questionable whether the testator had published the 
document to the witnesses. Consistent with Professor Langbein’s 
portrayal of the state of the law, some courts adopted an approach that 
required “literal compliance” with the requirement: 
 Literal compliance with regard to publication means that ‘in the 
presence of 2 witnesses present at the same time’ there must be 
some conscious indication by the testator, unmistakable in its 
import, that the act he is about to perform is, or the act he has 
performed was, the signing of his last will and testament. The 
declaration may take the form of an expression by the testator 
himself to the required effect; or it may be a statement by the 
scrivener or some one else acting for the testator in his presence and 
positively acquiesced in by the testator, that the testator’s last will is 
about to be signed or has been signed by him.134 
On the other hand, a number of courts rejected the strict 
compliance approach and instead adopted a substantial compliance 
approach. As the Montana Supreme Court stated: 
 Our conclusion in this matter is borne out by the following 
authorities: . . . Mr. Schouler in his work on Wills, § 326, says this: 
“A declaration before the witnesses in express terms that the 
instrument is one’s last will best satisfies the statute; but less than 
this is considered acceptable, provided that in some way the testator 
makes this fact known by acts or conduct, or, better still, by words. 
And, bearing in mind that the main object of such legislation is to 
repel fraud and establish a bona fide testament, we may assume that 
a substantial rather than a literal compliance with the statute 
formalities is sufficient.” See, also, 30 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law 
(2d Ed.) p. 589.135 
The Montana Supreme Court’s opinion is important for several 
reasons. First, it constitutes further evidence of a possible third 
 
132 RICHARD T. BOWSER & JAMES B. MCLAUGHLIN, JR., 1 WIGGINS WILLS & 
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN NORTH CAROLINA, § 8:8 THE TESTATOR’S REQUEST OF 
WITNESSES TO SIGN (4th ed. 2016); John B. Rees, Jr., American Wills Statutes: I, 46 VA. 
L. REV. 613, 620–21 (1960). 
133 BOWSER & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 132; HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE 
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1077 (3d ed. 1975). 
134 In re Hale’s Will, 121 A.2d 511, 518 (N.J. 1956). 
135 In re Miller’s Estate, 97 P. 935, 941–42 (Mont. 1908) (emphasis added). 
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approach to the issue of how strictly a testator must comply with the 
Wills Act formalities. Yet again the courts adopted their own 
substantial compliance approach to the formality. Second, the opinion 
is important because the Court does not purport to find literal 
compliance. Nor is the Court squirming to find that the conduct in 
question satisfies the strict compliance standard. The Montana 
Supreme Court expressly rejects literal compliance as the applicable 
test and instead adopts and applies substantial compliance to the 
publication formality. Finally, this is not an isolated example of a 
court losing its judicial fortitude with respect to the publication 
requirement when faced with compelling equities. In fact, a “large 
majority” of the jurisdictions that required publication accepted 
substantial compliance.136 
2. The Order of Signing Requirement 
The phrasing of a typical Wills Act for a formal will sets forth 
three core requirements: there must be (1) a writing, (2) that is signed 
or acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two or more 
witnesses, and (3) the writing must be signed by the witnesses.137 The 
phrasing implies that the testator should sign the will before the 
witnesses, and typically a testator does sign the will before the 
witnesses, but must the testator sign first? What if the witnesses sign 
before the testator? Does that per se invalidate the execution 
ceremony? In Marshall v. Mason,138 the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court ruled that “good sense and the plain meaning of the words of 
the statute” dictate that the testator must sign the will first.139 The 
Court’s reasoning and holding are classic examples of the literal strict 
compliance approach to the Wills Act formalities. 
On the other hand, in Waldrep v. Goodwin,140 the Georgia 
Supreme Court expressly overruled its prior plain meaning/strict 
compliance precedents and adopted a more liberal approach. The 
Court reasoned that “when all parties sit at the same table and affix 
 
136 BOWSER & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 132; W.R. Habeeb, Sufficiency of Publication 
of Will § 5[a] Substantial or Literal Compliance—Generally, 60 A.L.R.2d 124 (1958). 
137 See, e.g., Wills Act of 1837, 1 Vict., c. 26 (Eng.). The Act had great influence over 
many American jurisdictions. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (1969) (reducing the 
formalities associated with the Wills Act and loosening up some of the remaining 
formalities, but still maintaining the basic structure and core formalities). 
138 57 N.E. 340, 340 (Mass. 1900). 
139 Id. 
140 195 S.E.2d 432, 434–35 (Ga. 1973). 
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their signatures in the presence of each other” as part of “the same 
continuous transaction” the witnesses can satisfy the Wills Act 
requirement that they “attest and subscribe in the presence of the 
testator” even if the witnesses sign the will before the testator.141 A 
number of other courts have similarly held that the order of signing is 
unimportant so long as “the whole transaction is substantially 
contemporaneous . . . .”142 The approach that the order of signing is 
irrelevant so long as all of the parties sign the will before anyone 
leaves the room and everyone signs as part of one continuous 
execution ceremony, is nothing more than yet another example of a 
court-created form of substantial compliance with respect to the Wills 
Act formalities.143 
3. The Requirement that the Testator Sign the Will at the End 
Historically, many Wills Acts required the testator to “subscribe” 
or sign at the end of the will.144 Some courts, applying a literal strict 
compliance approach, expressly required the testator to sign at the 
logical end of the will—e.g., on the signature line for the testator if 
the will had one.145 Under the literal strict compliance approach, if 
the testator happened to write his or her name in the attestation clause 
below the signature line, under the strict compliance approach the will 
would be invalid because the testator had not signed at the end of the 
will.146 
On the other hand, a number of courts adopted a more purposive, 
intent-based substantial compliance approach to the requirement. 
Under this approach, so long as the testator wrote his or her name 
 
141 Id. at 435. 
142 Hopson v. Ewing, 353 S.W.2d 203, 206 (Ky. 1961); see also Estate of Lee, 37 Cal. 
Rptr. 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964); Conway v. Conway, 153 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 1958); Wilkinson 
v. White, 334 P.2d 564 (Utah 1959). 
143 One can make a strong case that the one continuous transaction or one whole 
transaction test is nothing more than a substantial compliance alternative to an otherwise 
strict compliance analysis. 
144 The English Statute of Frauds did not proscribe a location, but many American 
states nonetheless did. HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 
1076 (3d ed. 1975) (“The statutes of a number of states, however, require the testator to 
‘subscribe’ the will, or contain some other express requirement that the signature appear at 
the end of the will . . . .”). 
145 See Sears v. Sears, 82 N.E. 1067 (Ohio 1907). 
146 Id.; see also In re Estate of Bond, 153 P.2d 912 (Kan. 1944); Weiss Estate, 279 A.2d 
189 (Pa. 1971); Churchill’s Estate, 103 A. 533 (Pa. 1918); Orrell v. Cochran, 695 S.W.2d 
552 (Tex. 1958). 
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below all of the dispositive provisions in the will, the testator signed 
at the end of the will—even if the testator wrote his or her name in the 
attestation clause.147 As the Oklahoma Supreme Court said: “‘To 
reach a different conclusion would in our opinion, be unnecessarily 
raising form above substance to destroy a document that was 
undoubtedly the will of the testatrix.’”148 Moreover, the Court 
expressly acknowledged that the testator’s act of writing his name in 
the attestation clause rather than on the signature block line 
“constituted a substantial and sufficient compliance with the statute    
. . . .”149 This approach shows yet more evidence of a strict versus 
substantial compliance split with respect to the degree of compliance 
the courts historically have required. 
4. If the Testator Fails to Sign at the End of the Will as Required 
In those jurisdictions where the Wills Act required the testator to 
sign at the end of the will, where the testator signed the will before 
the end, an issue arises as to whether the whole document should be 
void or just the provisions after the testator’s signature. The courts 
split yet again between those that adopted more of a literal strict 
compliance approach that voided the entire will,150 and those that 
 
147 Coplin v. Anderson, 281 P.2d 186–88 (Okla. 1955) (acknowledging that the 
testator’s writing his name in the attestation “constituted a substantial and sufficient 
compliance with the statute”); see also Estate of Tonneson, 185 P.2d 78 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1947); Gardner v. Balboni, 588 A.2d 634, 638 (Conn. 1991) (citing McCue v. 
Turner, 68 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1934)); Lucas v. Brown, 219 S.W. 796 (Ky. 1920); In re 
Drake’s Will, 192 A. 428 (N.J. Orphans Ct. 1937); Younger v. Duffie, 94 N.Y. 535 
(1884); In re Eyett’s Will, 209 N.Y.S. 251 (Sur. Ct. 1925); In re Noon’s Will, 65 N.Y.S. 
568 (Sur. Ct. 1900) (discussing a signature within attestation clause); Coplin v. Anderson, 
281 P.2d 186 (Okla. 1955); In re Miller Will, 200 A.2d 284 (Pa. 1964); Gale v. Freeman, 
141 N.W. 226 (Wis. 1913) (discussing the testator’s signature appearing after attestation 
clause). See generally Thomas J. Goger, Annotation, Wills: When is Will Signed at “End” 
or “Foot” as Required by State, 44 A.L.R.3d 735 § 15[b] (1972). 
148  Coplin, 281 P.2d at 189 (quoting Estate of Chase, 124 P.2d 895, 900 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1942)). 
149 Id. at 187. 
150 See Sisters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul v. Kelly, 67 N.Y. 409 (1876); In re 
Winter’s Will, 98 N.Y.S.2d 312 (App. Div. 1950) (discussing how administrative clause 
appointing executors is below testator’s signature, whole will is invalid under Wills Act 
requirement that testator sign the end of the will); In re Estate of Tyner, 245 N.Y.S. 206 
(Sur. Ct.. 1930) (acknowledging that the court was applying strict compliance “to the end 
that no opening wedge may be driven into the protecting barrier against fraud and 
imposition which it interposes”); Appeal of Wineland, 12 A. 301 (Pa. 1888) 
(acknowledging English authority for more of a substantial compliance approach to the 
issue: “I am aware that our act of 1833 closely resembles the statute of 1 Vict. c, 26, and 
that some English authorities seem to sanction the doctrine contended for by the appellees. 
It is said, in Williams, Ex’rs 69, in commenting upon the above statute of Vict., and its 
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adopted a more liberal, intent-based “substantial compliance” 
approach that voided only as much of the document as was below the 
signature (thereby de facto putting the signature at the end of the 
will): 
Where the signature is placed at the close of the substantial 
provisions of the document, and the writing as signed is sufficient to 
effectuate the intention of the party signing it, the statute is 
substantially complied with, although there may be words following 
the signature which are unessential to the validity of the 
instrument.151 
That quote from the Kentucky Supreme Court is important because 
it evidences yet another court-created substantial compliance 
approach to a Wills Act formality. It is also important because the 
Court is not purporting to find literal compliance, nor is the Court 
squirming to find that the conduct in question satisfies the strict 
compliance standard. The Court expressly acknowledges that it is 
adopting and applying a substantial compliance approach as the better 
approach. 
5. The Requirement that a Holographic Will Be Entirely Handwritten 
The court-created substantial compliance doctrines are not limited 
to attested wills. Many courts have adopted the same liberal, intent-
based substantial compliance approach to some of the Wills Act 
formalities for a holographic will.152 Historically, the holographic 
Wills Act required the document to be entirely in the testator’s 
 
supplement of 15 Vict. c. 24, that ‘in order to get rid of the objection that the will was not 
signed at the foot or end thereof, the court, in some cases, has thought itself justified in 
regarding a portion running below the signature as forming no part of the will, and 
granting probate exclusive of that portion.’”). 
151 Ward v. Putnam, 85 S.W. 179, 182 (Ky. 1905) (emphasis added); see also In re 
Gibson’s Will, 128 A.D. 769, 771–72 (N.Y. 1908) (acknowledging the requirement that 
the will be signed at the end must be strictly construed, where testator added handwritten 
interlineation to will that was legally immaterial but part of which ran physically below 
where testator subsequently signed the will, the court upheld the will invoking the “spirit” 
of the statute and rejecting a “technical” construction and application of the statute); Baker 
v. Baker, 37 N.E. 125 (Ohio 1894) (discussing how the court took more of an intent-based 
approach). 
152 Only about half of the states permit holographic wills. Kevin R. Natale, A Survey, 
Analysis, and Evaluation of Holographic Will Statutes, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 159, 161 
(1988). Inasmuch as the paradigm holographic will scenario inherently assumes a 
layperson creates the will, some courts have reasoned that it makes more sense to apply a 
substantial compliance approach to execution issues than strict compliance. See Estate of 
Black, 641 P.2d 754, 755–56 (Cal. 1982). 
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handwriting.153 Literal strict compliance should have meant that if 
there was any material on the will that was not in the testator’s 
handwriting, the will was invalid. 
Yet from the earliest cases virtually all courts reasoned that when 
the legislature provided that a holographic will must be “entirely” or 
“wholly” in the testator’s handwriting, the legislature did not use the 
term in its “absolute, utter and rigidly uncompromising sense.”154 
Instead, the courts fashioned a more common sense substantial 
compliance approach.155 Using either an intent-based approach (so 
long as the testator did not intend to incorporate the non-handwritten 
material on the paper, the non-handwritten material could be ignored 
and the will would still be valid)156 or the more liberal surplusage 
approach (so long as the non-handwritten material was not essential to 
the validity or meaning of the will, the non-handwritten material 
could be ignored and the will would still be valid),157 the courts 
reasoned that, inasmuch as holographic wills were intended to be 
drafted and executed by the layperson, it made more sense to apply a 
substantial compliance approach than a literal compliance approach. 
In time, the Uniform Probate Code codified the surplusage approach 
by changing the requirement from the entire will must be in the 
testator’s handwriting to only the material provisions must be in the 
testator’s handwriting.158 
6. The Requirement that a Holographic Will Be Dated 
The courts faced a similar issue with the traditional requirement 
that a holographic will be dated. Because the early holographic Wills 
Act typically required that the holographic will be (1) dated, and (2) 
entirely in the testator’s handwriting, the courts could not use either 
the intent approach or the surplusage approach where the will’s date 
 
153 Natale, supra note 152, at 159; Miller, supra note 2, at 212. 
154 In re Estate of Billings, 1 P. 701 (Cal. 1884); Bell v. Timmins, 58 S.E.2d 55, 59 (Va. 
1950); see also Miller, supra note 2, at 213 (discussing how strict construction of the 
handwriting requirement could invalidate a holograph containing typed or preprinted 
matter, even if the non-handwritten material was unrelated to the substance of the will). 
155 Timmins, 58 S.E.2d at 59–60 (emphasis added) (“It is not my disposition to relax at 
all the requirements of the statute, but merely to do what we do freely in the matter of 
construction and other fields of law give the statute a sound and fair construction and 
rigidly insist upon substantial compliance with its requirements.”). 
156 Richard Lewis Brown, The Holographic Problem—The Case Against Holographic 
Wills, 74 TENN. L. REV. 93, 101–04 (2006); Natale, supra note 152, at 171–73. 
157 Natale, supra note 152, at 173–76; Brown, supra note 158, at 104–10. 
158 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a)(3) (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A (1998). 
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was incomplete or not completely in the testator’s handwriting.159 
The issue was presented front and center in In re Hail’s Estate.160 The 
decedent, John D. Hail, handwrote out what purported to be a 
holographic will, but all he wrote for the date was “November, 
1919.”161 The Court’s analysis includes a discussion of the state of 
the law with respect to the issue, and not surprisingly that analysis 
acknowledges a split in the law: 
 The sole question to be passed on in this case is: Does the 
omission of the day of the month in the date to said will invalidate 
it, and justify the court in denying it probate as the last will and 
testament of John D. Hail, deceased? . . . The reading of these 
authorities cited by respective counsels, as well as independent 
research on our part, shows that there are two well-defined rules of 
construction. One may be defined as that line which holds to a strict 
compliance with the statute, and the other that holds that a 
substantial compliance with the statute is all that is required.162 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted the substantial compliance 
approach.163 
The Court’s opinion is important not only because it provides 
further evidence of a court-created substantial compliance approach, it 
also calls into question Professor Langbein’s characterization of the 
inconsistent case law. The Court is not “purport[ing] to find literal 
compliance,”164 nor is the Court squirming to find that the conduct in 
question satisfies the strict compliance standard. The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court expressly rejects strict compliance as the applicable 
test and instead adopts and applies substantial compliance to the 
holographic Wills Act formality that the will be dated. Nor is the 
Court’s holding an isolated ruling by a court losing its judicial 
fortitude in the face of compelling equities. The split in the case law 
shows that the intent-based, purposive, substantial compliance 
approach to the formality in question was a widely recognized and 
widely accepted approach. 
 
159 Miller, supra note 2, at 212; Natale, supra note 152, at 159. 
160 235 P. 916 (Okla. 1923). 
161 Id. at 917. 
162 Id. (emphasis added). 
163 Id. at 921. 
164 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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7. Post-Death Attestation 
Historically, most American Wills Acts were based on either the 
English Statute of Frauds of 1677, or the Wills Act of 1837.165 Both 
statutes expressly require the witnesses to sign the will in the 
testator’s presence.166 The requirement that the witnesses sign in the 
testator’s presence implicitly, if not expressly, imposed a temporal 
requirement that the witnesses had to sign the will immediately after 
the testator signed the will and while the testator was alive.167 Where 
a testator was not conscious of the fact that the witnesses were signing 
because he or she is unconscious, asleep, or dead, the will was invalid 
because the witnesses had not signed in the testator’s presence.168 
In 1969 the Uniform Law Commission revised the Uniform 
Probate Code to facilitate the valid execution of a will.169 Several 
traditional Wills Act formalities were eliminated,170 including the 
requirement that the witnesses had to attest in the presence of the 
testator (or each other).171 That revision created a latent ambiguity: 
 
165 Herbert E. Tucker et al., Holographic and Nonconforming Wills: Dispensing with 
Formalities—Part I, 31 COLO. LAW. 57, 57 (2002); Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and 
Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1994); Anne-
Marie Rhodes, Notarized Wills, 27 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 419, 419–20 (2014). 
166 Wills Act of 1837, 7 Wm. 4 & 1 Vict. ch. 26, 217 (1837); The Statute of Frauds of 
1677, 29 Car. II., ch. 3 § 5 (1676); see also James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation 
Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541, 547–48 (1990). 
167 The two traditional tests for the testator’s presence are the line of sight test and the 
conscious presence test. Both inherently include the notion that the testator is physically 
present, though to slightly different degrees, but nonetheless that the testator is within the 
immediate vicinity of the witnesses when they sign and is consciously aware of what the 
witnesses are doing. W.W. Allen, What Constitutes the Presence of the Testator in the 
Witnessing of his Will, 75 A.L.R.2d 318 (1961) (“Undoubtedly, to be effective the signing 
by the witnesses must occur in the testator’s conscious presence.”). Where a testator who 
is not conscious of the fact that the witnesses are signing because he or she is unconscious, 
asleep or dead, the will was not executed in the testator’s presence. 
168 Maturiz Estate, 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 692, 694 (C.P. 1959) (“[T]he subscription is not 
made in the testator’s presence, if at the time of subscribing, from sleep or other cause, he 
is unconscious of the act of subscribing”) (citation omitted). 
169 In re Estate of Peters, 526 A.2d 1005, 1010 (N.J. 1987) (acknowledging that several 
traditional Wills Act formalities were eliminated). 
170 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a)(3) cmt. (amended 1990) 8 U.L.A. 144 (1998) 
(“The formalities for execution of a witnessed will have been reduced to a minimum.”); 
Stephanie J. Willbanks, Parting Is Such Sweet Sorrow, But Does It Have to Be So 
Complicated? Transmission of Property at Death in Vermont, 29 VT. L. REV. 895, 934 
(2005). 
171 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 144 (1998); see also In re 
Estate of McGurrin, 743 P.2d 994, 998 (Idaho 1987). 
By using the verb “witnessed,” and by directing this verb toward certain 
antecedent acts of the testator, the drafters of section 2-502 plainly contemplated 
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inasmuch as the new UPC Wills Act was silent as to when an 
attesting witness must sign the will, if the witnesses did not sign when 
the testator signed or acknowledged, how much later could the 
witnesses sign? In particular, could the witness sign after the testator 
died? Some courts, favoring a bright-line test, adopted a strict 
compliance approach that the witnesses must sign the will before the 
testator dies.172 
Other courts adopted a more purposive approach to the issue. In In 
re Estate of Peters, the New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that 
New Jersey was a strict compliance jurisdiction,173 but the Court also 
quoted at length Professor Langbein’s arguments in favor of 
substantial compliance. The Court expressly adopted a purposive 
approach to the issue174 and construed the statute as requiring that the 
witnesses must attest the will within a reasonable period of time after 
the will’s execution,175 even if that occurred after the testator’s 
death.176 Permitting post-death attestation, so long as it is within a 
reasonable time of the testator’s death, is nothing more than 
substantial compliance as opposed to the bright-line, strict compliance 
approach that the witnesses must sign before the testator dies.177 
 
that at least one of these enumerated acts would occur where it could, in fact, be 
“witnessed.” After such an act had been “witnessed,” it became immaterial 
whether the witnesses added their signatures to the will in the testator’s presence 
or elsewhere. Accordingly, the clause in earlier drafts, requiring the will to “be 
signed by [the] witnesses in the presence of the testator,” was dropped. 
Id. 
172 See Estate of Saueressig, 136 P.3d 201 (Cal. 2006); In re Estate of Flicker, 339 
N.W.2d 914 (Neb. 1983); Rogers v. Rogers, 691 P.2d 114, 115 (Or. Ct. App. 1984). 
173 526 A.2d at 1008, 1014. 
174 Id. at 1011 (“Resolution of the issue of when the witnesses must sign the will in 
relation to their observations of the execution of the will by the testator follows from the 
purpose of the requirement that the will be signed. Because, as noted, the signatory 
function serves an evidentiary purpose, the signatures of the witnesses would lose 
probative worth and tend to fail of this purpose if the witnesses were permitted to sign at a 
time remote from their required observations as witnesses . . . . By implication, the statute 
requires that the signatures of witnesses be affixed to a will within a reasonable period of 
time from the execution of the will.”) (emphasis added). 
175 Id. at 1010–11. 
176 Id. at 1013 (holding that a delay of fifteen months between when the testator signed 
the will and when the witnesses signed the will was too long). 
177 The UPC subsequently codified the position permitting post-death attestation so 
long as it is within a reasonable time period. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a)(3) 
(amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 144 (1988). 
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F. The Case for Flexible Strict Compliance 
When taken together, the number of doctrines that expressly or de 
facto adopt and apply a substantial compliance approach to the Wills 
Act formalities is striking.178 No doubt literal strict compliance can be 
harsh and relentless, but the number and variety of court-created 
substantial compliance doctrines that find a way to validate a will that 
literal strict compliance would invalidate is impressive, particularly 
when juxtaposed with Professor Langbein’s characterization of the 
state of the law. 
Proving that the courts have created a number of doctrines that are 
either expressly or de facto substantial compliance approaches over 
the years is, however, only the first step. The question is whether they 
can be synthesized into a coherent and defensible approach to the 
issue of compliance with the Wills Act formalities. Unless the 
doctrines can be synthesized, they remain just a number of isolated, 
ad hoc, disparate doctrines adopted to promote testator’s intent in a 
particular setting. 
III 
FLEXIBLE STRICT COMPLIANCE VS. SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE 
It is unclear how much of the court-created substantial compliance 
case law Professor Langbein had in mind when he summarily 
dismissed the case law in his Substantial Compliance and Harmless 
Error articles. It is unclear whether the quantity of case law that either 
expressly or de facto adopts a substantial compliance approach would 
give him cause to reconsider. Between the Substantial Compliance 
and the Harmless Error articles, he depicts the case law as dishonest, 
stating that the courts use “sleight-of-hand” and trickery to find strict 
compliance where there is none: “a vast, contradictory, unpredictable 
and sometimes dishonest case law in which the courts purport to find 
literal compliance in cases which in fact instance defective 
compliance.”179 
 
178 See 2 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 19.4, at 14–15 n.20 (3d ed. 2003) 
(acknowledging and citing to a number of courts that had adopted and applied a substantial 
compliance approach). This acknowledgment is not the result of Professor Langbein’s 
substantial compliance proposal. Earlier editions of the treatise which pre-date Professor 
Langbein’s Substantial Compliance article clearly and expressly acknowledge that a 
number of courts had adopted and applied substantial compliance; see also 1 PAGE ON THE 
LAW OF WILLS § 233, at 407 n.14 (2d ed. 1926). 
179 See Langbein, supra note 9, at 525; see also Langbein, supra note 13, at 27–28. 
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If that truly is the reason Professor Langbein summarily dismissed 
the inconsistent case law, one would hope that he would reconsider 
his position.180 The body of case law that either expressly or de facto 
adopts a substantial compliance approach and that does not purport to 
find literal compliance is substantial.181 That being said, one can still 
question the honesty of the case law. Is it dishonest for a court to 
apply one approach to certain Wills Act formalities in certain 
scenarios and a different approach to the same or other Wills Act 
formalities in other scenarios? Would it be more honest to either 
apply substantial compliance across the board to all Wills Act 
formality issues, as Professor Langbein proposes, or not apply it at all, 
as literal strict compliance advocates? Is the only difference between 
Professor Langbein’s substantial compliance and flexible strict 
compliance that, under the latter, the courts pick and choose when to 
apply substantial compliance, while Professor Langbein applies 
substantial compliance universally to all Wills Act compliance issues? 
Or might it be that there is something more complicated going on? 
A. Professor Langbein’s Substantial Compliance Proposal 
1. The Analytical Steps 
Professor Langbein’s substantial compliance proposal adopts a 
rather holistic approach to the analysis, focusing more on the Wills 
Act and its purposes than the formalities: 
 The finding of a formal defect should lead not to automatic 
invalidity, but to a further inquiry: does the noncomplying 
document express the decedent’s testamentary intent, and does its 
form sufficiently approximate Wills Act formality to enable the 
court to conclude that it serves the purposes of the Wills Act?182 
There are three core Wills Act formalities for a formal will: the 
writing, the signature, and the attestation.183 These three core 
 
180 Much, if not most, of the case law does not purport to find literal compliance. 
Instead the courts reject the strict compliance approach in favor of a substantial 
compliance approach. The courts then typically found that the execution ceremony in 
question substantially complied with the Wills Act formality in question and that was good 
enough. See supra notes 97–103, 110–19, 132–77 and accompanying text. 
181 See supra notes 97–103, 110–19, 132–77 and accompanying text. 
182 Langbein, supra note 9, at 489. 
183 Joseph M. Mentrek, Estate Planning in a Digital World, 19 OHIO PROB. L.J. 195 
(2009) (“The requirement that a will be in writing, signed in the presence of witnesses, has 
existed for hundreds of years.”); EST. PLAN. LAW & TAX ¶ 1.07 (“Typical requirements 
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formalities have spawned a plethora of additional formalities. The 
Wills Act involved in the Groffman case is a classic example of the 
multitude of formalities that may exist in a Wills Act: 
 [N]o will shall be valid unless it shall be in writing and executed 
in manner hereinafter mentioned; (that is to say,) it shall be signed 
at the foot or end thereof by the testator, or by some other person in 
his presence and by his direction; and such signature shall be made 
or acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two or more 
witnesses present at the same time, and such witnesses shall attest 
and shall subscribe the will in the presence of the testator, but no 
form of attestation shall be necessary.184 
The phrasing of Professor Langbein’s substantial compliance 
proposal de-emphasizes the individual formalities as distinct 
requirements and shifts the focus to testator’s intent and the “purposes 
of the Wills Act.”185 
2. Does the Document Express Testamentary Intent? 
Assuming a noncomplying document, the first step under Professor 
Langbein’s substantial compliance doctrine is to analyze whether the 
will proponent can prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the “document express[es] the decedent’s testamentary intent.”186 
That analytical step is noncontroversial. It is well accepted that all 
wills, formal or holographic, must express testamentary intent.187 
3. Does the Document’s Form Approximate Wills Act Formality? 
Assuming, arguendo, it can be proved that the defectively executed 
instrument expresses the decedent’s testamentary intent, then 
 
include that the will be in writing, signed by the testator, and witnessed by persons who 
sign the will as witnesses in the testator’s presence.”). 
184 See In re Groffman, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 733, [1969] 2 All E.R. 108 (Q.B.). 
185 Supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
186 Langbein, supra note 9, at 489. 
187 Mark Glover, A Taxonomy of Testamentary Intent, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 569, 
569, 571 (2016). Historically testamentary intent, as a practical matter, asked whether the 
decedent intended the document to be his or her will. Id. at 572–74. If the decedent 
intended the document to be his or her last will and testament, it follows logically that the 
document expresses the decedent’s testamentary wishes. Id. The nuanced issue with 
respect to testamentary intent is whether the decedent must have intended for that piece of 
paper to be probated as his or her will or whether it is sufficient that the document 
expresses the decedent’s testamentary wishes even if he or she did not intend for that piece 
of paper to be probated as his or her will. The former view of testamentary intent 
constitutes the more traditional, strict compliance approach to testamentary intent, while 
the latter articulation constitutes the modern trend, more intent-based approach. For a more 
detailed and more interesting analysis of the issue, see generally id. 
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Professor Langbein proposes that the analysis shift to whether the 
noncomplying document’s “form sufficiently approximate Wills Act 
formality to enable the court to conclude that it serves the purposes of 
the Wills Act[.]”188 When put under the analytical microscope, that 
analytical step is more of a change in the law than it appears. Under 
Professor Langbein’s substantial compliance proposal, the disparate 
Wills Act formalities are bundled together: “[D]oes [the document’s] 
form sufficiently approximate Wills Act formality to enable the court 
to conclude that it serves the purposes of the Wills Act?”189 The focus 
is not on the parties and how close they came to meeting the 
requirements of the formality in question. Nor is the focus on the 
formality per se. Instead the focus shifts to the document’s form and 
whether that form sufficiently approximate Wills Act formality to 
enable the court to conclude that the document’s form serves the 
purposes underlying the Wills Act. First, it is unclear exactly what 
Professor Langbein means by the document’s form. Second, it is 
unclear exactly what Professor Langbein means by the phrase Wills 
Act formality—singular. The logical assumption is that he is not 
referring to the individual formalities per se but rather to the 
traditional formalistic approach with which the courts have 
historically approached the issue.190 Assuming, arguendo, that is the 
intended meaning, it is far from clear when a noncomplying 
document’s form would sufficiently approximate that formality to 
enable the court to conclude that it serves the purposes of the Wills 
Act.191 The practical effect of the analytical complexity is to shift the 
focus more to the final step of the analysis: whether the document’s 
form serves the purposes of the Wills Act. That obviously gives rise 
to the simple question: What are the purposes of the Wills Act? 
4. The Functional Approach to the Purposes of the Wills Act 
Professor Langbein starts his analysis of the policies served by the 
Wills Act by stating that “[t]he first principle of the law of wills is 
freedom of testation.”192 Shortly thereafter he asserts that a “tension 
 
188 Langbein, supra note 9, at 489 (emphasis added). 
189 Id. (emphasis added). 
190 See Langbein, supra note 9, at 497; Langbein, supra note 13, at 1, 4–7. 
191 Lindgren, supra note 6, at 1014 (acknowledging the difficulty the Queensland, 
Australia, courts had implementing Professor Langbein’s substantial compliance 
approach); see also Langbein, supra note 13, at 1. 
192 Langbein, supra note 9, at 491. 
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is apparent between this principle of ‘free testation and the stiff, 
formal’ requirements of the Wills Act.’”193 The implicit assertion is 
that, to the extent the formalities conflict with the “first principle of    
. . . freedom of testation[,]” the formalities should yield to 
testamentary freedom if they cannot be justified—not just as an 
academic matter, but as applied to any given will offered for 
probate.194 If a formality stands in the way of promoting testamentary 
intent, and the formality cannot be justified under the circumstances 
of the case, the formality should yield: the court should dispense with 
the formality and probate the will. Professor Langbein’s substantial 
compliance and harmless error approaches reflect this philosophical 
approach. 
Professor Langbein’s discussion of the underlying policies then 
shifts to the functions served by the Wills Act. Professor Langbein 
cites to, adopts, and elaborates on the functional approach first set 
forth in the classic article by Gulliver and Tilson.195 Gulliver and 
Tilson first articulated three functions served by the Wills Act: the 
ritual function, the evidentiary function, and the protective 
function.196 Professor Langbein added a fourth: the channeling 
function.197 While the functions are important and constitute a well-
recognized approach to the benefits of the Wills Act formalities, 
Professor Langbein’s discussion naturally gives rise to some 
questions as to the relationship of the different abstract terms and 
concepts being analyzed. What exactly is the relationship between 
testamentary intent and the functions served by the Wills Act 
formalities? Is testator’s intent a first principle of the law of wills or 
the first principle? Are the functions in and of themselves policy 
considerations, or are the functions designed to serve the public 
policy considerations?198 
 
193 Id. at 491–92; cf. Horton, supra note 7, at 575 (“[S]cholars sometimes argue that 
formalism safeguards intent indirectly. Because testators and their attorneys have the axe 
of strict compliance hanging over their heads, they must be meticulous.”). 
194 Langbein, supra note 9, at 491. 
195 Id. at 492–98 (citing and discussing Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 7). 
196 Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 7, at 513; Anne-Marie Rhodes, supra note 167, at 
419–20. 
197 Langbein, supra note 9, at 489, 493–94. 
198 One cannot help but wonder to what extent the functional approach fits Judge 
Posner’s comment about the discourse between academics and the bench: “But little of this 
largely scholarly literature gives the judiciary the kind of help it most needs . . . . Partly it 
is because rewards (status, prestige, not necessarily money) in academic law go to 
doctrinalists and theoreticians who write for each other on a plane of discourse 
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The impression that testamentary intent is the be all and end all of 
the Wills Act, and any other policies served by the functions are at 
best second tier considerations, is supported by Professor Langbein’s 
reliance on the classic article by Gulliver and Tilson. Gulliver and 
Tilson are even more emphatic in their expression of that hierarchy: 
 One fundamental proposition is that, under a legal system 
recognizing the individualistic institution of private property and 
granting to the owner the power to determine his successors in 
ownership, the general philosophy of the courts should favor giving 
effect to an intentional exercise of that power. This is commonplace 
enough, but it needs constant emphasis, for it may be obscured or 
neglected in inordinate preoccupation with detail or dialectic. A 
court absorbed in purely doctrinal arguments may lose sight of the 
important and desirable objective of sanctioning what the transferor 
wanted to do, even though it is convinced that he wanted to do it. If 
this objective is primary, the requirements of execution, which 
concern only the form of the transfer—what the transferor or others 
must do to make it legally effective—seem justifiable only as 
implements for its accomplishment, and should be so interpreted by 
the courts in these cases. They surely should not be revered as ends 
in themselves, enthroning formality over frustrated intent.199 
It comes as no surprise that Professor Langbein ultimately adopts 
harmless error as his preferred approach over substantial 
compliance.200 Harmless error essentially codifies Gulliver and 
Tilson’s fundamental proposition that testator’s intent is the 
paramount consideration underlying the Wills Act.201 Theoretically, 
all other considerations, including questions concerning compliance 
with the formalities set forth in the Wills Act, should yield when there 
is clear and convincing evidence of testator’s intent.202 
 
inaccessible or unhelpful to judges . . . .” RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE 
ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY 295 (2016). 
199 Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 7, at 2–3 (footnotes omitted). 
200 Langbein, supra note 13, at 20. 
201 See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 7, at 2–3. 
202 The Uniform Probate Code and the Restatement (Third), however, do not take the 
intent-based approach to its logical extreme. Even when there is clear and convincing 
evidence of the testator’s intent, both of them still require a writing. See UNIF. PROBATE 
CODE § 2-503 (2010) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 215 (2013 & Supp. 2014); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1999). 
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5. To What Extent Are Economic Considerations Relevant? 
There is no doubt that a decedent’s testamentary intent is an 
important public policy consideration, but it is not the only relevant 
public policy consideration. Gulliver and Tilson implicitly admit as 
much: 
 Why do these requirements exist and what functions may they 
usefully perform? If all transfers were required to be made before 
the court determining their validity, it is probable that no formalities 
except oral declarations in the presence of the court would be 
necessary. The court could observe the transferor, hear his 
statements, and clear up ambiguities by appropriate questions. But 
such a procedure does not correspond with existing mores and 
would be entirely impracticable in our present society for various 
rather obvious reasons.203 
Maybe I spent too much time at the University of Chicago, but it 
seems rather obvious that one of those reasons would be that the 
transaction costs associated with such a procedure would be 
prohibitively expensive. Accordingly, it seems rather obvious that one 
of the important public policy considerations served by the Wills Act 
is to help control the costs of administration associated with 
ascertaining and giving effect to testator’s intent.204 Yet there is no 
express mention of costs of administration, efficiency, or any other 
economic consideration in Gulliver and Tilson’s discussion of the 
functions served by the Wills Act formalities. 
While Professor Langbein’s discussion of the functions served by 
the Wills Act formalities mentions economic considerations, he does 
not treat economic considerations as a public policy consideration in 
its own right. When discussing the channeling function, the function 
added by Professor Langbein,205 he acknowledges “the relationship 
between the formalities and efficient judicial administration.”206 
Historically the formalities had the effect of channeling testators to 
lawyers who used standardized documents, with standardized 
terminology, and who supervised the execution of the instrument.207 
 
203 Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 7, at 3 (emphasis added). 
204 See Horton, supra note 7, at 574 (“[C]oncern about the burden on the judicial 
system has also surfaced during the debate over the harmless error rule. Scholars have 
voiced anxiety that replacing strict compliance with harmless error may increase litigation 
rates by providing new ammunition to disappointed heirs.”). 
205 See Langbein, supra note 9, at 493–94. 
206 Id. at 494. 
207 Id. at 493–94; see also Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of 
the Dead: Property, Succession, and Society, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 340, 367–68 (1966). 
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The resulting document should have fewer, if any, issues with respect 
to validity and construction, thereby saving both testator’s estate and 
the probate system time and money.208 Rarely would there be 
questions as to whether the document was intended to be the person’s 
will or as to the construction of the will. The document would sail 
through probate at minimum cost to the estate and the judicial system. 
While the channeling function has a “relationship” with judicial 
efficiency, Professor Langbein’s discussion of the channeling 
function implies he believes the economic effect is more of a 
consequential benefit than a public policy consideration in its own 
right. He notes that the standardization of wills is “a matter of unusual 
importance” for the courts, and it “benefits” the testator. Nowhere, 
however, does he acknowledge economic efficiency as a public policy 
consideration in its own right to be juxtaposed with testamentary 
freedom.209 Professor Langbein’s primary point is that the channeling 
function serves a linguistic purpose.210 In the context of the Wills 
Act, the channeling function promotes testamentary intent by 
providing standard phrasing and terminology for testators to use to 
ensure that the probate court understands and gives effect to testator’s 
true intent. Professor Langbein cites Professor Friedman’s work 
which also focuses on the linguistic benefits of the channeling 
function, while acknowledging the bureaucratic benefits.211 While 
Professor Langbein was one of the first to acknowledge the economic 
benefits of the Wills Act, his discussion indicates that the economic 
benefits are not an important public policy consideration in their own 
right but rather are more a tangential or secondary benefit at best. 
 
208 Langbein, supra note 9, at 494; see also Glover, supra note 2, at 606. 
209 Langbein, supra note 9, at 494; see also Adam J. Hirsh, Inheritance and 
Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1066 n.31 (1996) (“Fuller called this the 
‘channeling function’ of legal formalities; as he pointed out, the procedural efficiency of 
formalities is useful for courts as well as for individual actors who seek low-cost means of 
ensuring the legal effectiveness of their transactions.”) (emphasis added). 
210 Although Professor Langbein is credited with being the first to articulate the 
channeling function as it applies to the Wills Act formalities, Professor Langbein 
acknowledges that he is building upon Professor Fuller’s work, which recognized the 
channeling function of the statute of fraud formalities as applied to the law of contracts. 
Professor Fuller argued that the primary benefit of the channeling function is that it serves 
a linguistic function. Langbein, supra note 9, at 493 (citing and discussing Lon L. Fuller, 
Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941)). 
211 Langbein, supra note 9, at 493 (citing and discussing Friedman, supra note 209, at 
368). 
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Arguably the best evidence that Professor Langbein considers any 
economic component to the Wills Act formalities as, at best, 
secondary considerations, is his discussion of the possible 
consequences of his proposed substantial compliance doctrine. In 
commenting on the possible effects, Professor Langbein returns to the 
implicit economic benefits of the formalities: 
 If the substantial compliance doctrine can do individual justice 
only at the price of disorder and uncertainty in the patterns of 
transfer and testation, the gain may not be worth the cost. It must be 
shown that the substantial compliance doctrine would not confuse 
the channels, nor clog them with significantly increased 
litigation.212 
While implicitly acknowledging that there is an economic cost-
benefit component to the analysis, the phrasing suggests economic 
considerations are relevant only at the extreme: only if the cost of 
substantial compliance is “disorder and uncertainty in the patterns of 
transfer and testation.”213 Such phrasing hardly constitutes an 
economic analysis of the proposal. An economic analysis focuses on 
marginal costs and benefits.214 Whether one should enter into a 
 
212 Langbein, supra note 9, at 523. 
213 Id. 
214 Terry L. Anderson, Markets and the Environment: Friends or Foes, 55 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 81, 81 (2004) (“This type of analysis illustrates the way economists often 
approach problems, namely using marginal analysis to maximize some value subject to 
opportunity cost constraints. From this analysis follows one of the main tenets of 
economics: if the marginal benefits are greater than the marginal cost, do it. We 
economists think this marginal analysis is a pretty powerful way of thinking about the 
world.”); Amy Sinden, Formality and Informality in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2015 UTAH L. 
REV. 93, 100–04 (2015). 
 If one were to ask a layperson what is the optimal level of crime, most people would 
answer “zero.” If one were to ask an economist whether a zero rate of crime was the 
optimal rate of crime, he or she would immediately answer “no.” For an economist, the 
optimal level of crime is whatever crime rate exists at the point where an additional 
expenditure of $1.00 on crime prevention does not produce at least one dollar’s worth of 
additional benefit. Society should be willing to invest in efforts aimed at reducing the 
crime rate so long as every dollar spent produces at least a dollar’s worth of benefits. 
Once, however, a dollar spent does not produce at least a dollar’s worth of benefits, 
society should accept that level of crime. See Mark A. Cohen, The Economics of Crime 
and Punishment: Implications for Sentencing of Economic Crimes and New Technology 
Offenses, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 503, 504 (2000) (citing and discussing Gary S. Becker, 
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 171 (1968)). 
 Professor Langbein’s substantial compliance and harmless error doctrines take more of 
a non-economist’s approach to the question of what is the optimal level of testamentary 
intent that should be given effect. Under his harmless error proposal, anytime there is clear 
and convincing evidence that the document expresses the decedent’s testamentary intent, 
the document should be probated. Such an approach ignores the economic costs that may 
be associated with producing this acknowledged benefit. It implicitly argues that the 
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proposed transaction, or adopt a proposed law, depends on whether 
the marginal benefits of the proposed transaction or law exceed the 
marginal costs of the proposed transaction or law.215 The proposed 
transaction/law is efficient if the marginal benefits exceed the 
marginal costs. 
In contrast, Professor Langbein’s phrasing evidences at best a 
superficial economic analysis, one that supports the view that 
Professor Langbein and the functional approach do not consider 
economic considerations to be a public policy consideration in their 
own right.216 Economic considerations are relevant only at the 
extreme, not at the margin. In arguing that his substantial compliance 
proposal should be adopted, Professor Langbein implicitly argues that 
the benefits associated with the “individual justice” served by giving 
effect to a decedent’s testamentary intent should prevail unless the 
costs associated with substantial compliance rose to the level of 
“disorder and uncertainty in the patterns of transfer and testation.”217 
Not only is that wording of the analysis inconsistent with traditional 
economic analysis,218 such vague and nontraditional phrasing makes 
it difficult to measure and assess such costs. Accordingly, the 
likelihood one will conclude that the clear and easy-to-assess benefits 
of his proposal outweigh the vague and uncertain costs, is increased 
because the economic costs are not fully appreciated.219 
 
decedent’s testamentary intent should be given effect to promote “individual justice” 
notwithstanding the potential costs—social costs in particular—associated with doing so. 
An economist would have strong reservations about such an approach. An economist 
would prefer an approach that does a better job of trying to insure that testamentary intent 
is given effect so long as it is efficient: so long as doing so produces more benefit than it 
costs—at both the individual and the social level. 
215 See Anderson, supra note 214. 
216 Interestingly, Professor Langbein uses the phrases “free testation” and “the principle 
of free testation” as a public policy consideration at odds with Wills Act formalities and 
formalism. Langbein, supra note 9, at 491–92, 494, 500. If Professor Langbein means for 
such phrases to have an economic component, with apologies to Milton Friedman, there’s 
is no such thing as “free testation.” MILTON FRIEDMAN, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS A 
FREE LUNCH (Open Court Publishing Co. 1975). 
217 Langbein, supra note 9, at 523. 
218 See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text. 
219 Professor Langbein goes on to admit that substantial compliance will result in 
increased litigation where proponents offer to prove that a noncomplying instrument 
should nevertheless be probated under the substantial compliance analysis, but asserts that 
substantial compliance will have “no effect whatever upon the primary conduct. The 
incentive for due execution would remain.” Langbein, supra note 9, at 524. Other scholars, 
however, have questioned that assertion: “The harmless error power might tend to 
encourage carelessness and breed litigation, or open up avenues for fraud.” Adam J. 
WENDEL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/24/2017  6:08 PM 
386 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95, 337 
Interestingly, when discussing the purposes of the Wills Act, 
Professor Langbein’s Harmless Error article reverts to the more 
traditional functional approach. Moreover, when discussing the 
functions served by the Wills Act, the text mentions only the 
evidentiary, cautionary, and protection functions.220 The channeling 
function is relegated to a footnote.221 Unlike the Substantial 
Compliance article, which at least hinted at the possible relevance of 
economic considerations, the Harmless Error article is devoid of any 
economic analysis or phrasing. Instead, the approach is closer to the 
traditional approach articulated by Gulliver and Tilson: that the 
formalities serve no purpose other than to insure intent, and where 
there is clear and convincing evidence of testator’s intent, the court 
should be authorized and prepared to waive any formalities that 
would otherwise stand in the way of giving effect to that intent.222 
B. Flexible Strict Compliance 
1. A More Pragmatic Approach to the Purposes Served by the Wills 
Act 
In contrast to Professor Langbein’s functional approach to the 
public policy considerations underlying the Wills Act formalities, the 
court-created flexible strict compliance approach is more pragmatic. 
While the court-created flexible strict compliance approach overlaps 
to some degree with the Gulliver and Tilson/Langbein functional 
approach, the courts’ articulation and assessment of the public policy 
considerations differs greatly with that of Gulliver and 
Tilson/Langbein. 
No doubt the courts would agree that in an ideal world, where an 
individual has expressed his or her intent with respect to who should 
get his or her property following his or her death, such intent should 
be ascertained and given effect regardless of the costs. Only then 
 
Hirsch, Formalizing Gratuitous Transfers and Contractual Transfers: A Situational 
Theory, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 797, 829 (2014) (discussing harmless error, but the logic 
applies equally to Professor Langbein’s original substantial compliance proposal); see also 
In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1345 (N.J. 1991) (“Our adoption of the doctrine of 
substantial compliance should not be construed as an invitation either to carelessness or 
chicanery.”) The Court’s statement that substantial compliance is not an “invitation” to 
carelessness is an implicit acknowledgment that it is a likely risk, the question is just how 
much of a risk. 
220 Langbein, supra note 13, at 87. 
221 Id. at 3 n.6. 
222 See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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would the legal system fulfill its general philosophy of “giving effect 
to an intentional exercise of”223 the decedent’s “power to determine 
his successors in ownership.”224 The courts realize, however, that we 
do not live in such an ideal world; we live in a world of limited 
resources. In a world of limited resources tough decisions have to be 
made with respect to how those limited resources should be 
distributed among different needs. This is particularly true with 
respect to public resources.225 With the myriad of competing claims 
on public resources, it is poor public policy to spend excessive public 
funds on ascertaining testator’s intent when imposing reasonable 
formalities on testators, reasonably interpreted and reasonably 
applied, can save society money and permit society to allocate its 
scarce resources to more pressing needs. Limiting the costs of 
administration associated with ascertaining and giving effect to a 
decedent’s testamentary intent is a reasonable and important public 
policy consideration, just as important as ascertaining and giving 
effect to a decedent’s testamentary intent.226 
In contrast to the functional approach adopted by both Langbein 
and Gulliver and Tilson, the courts and many scholars historically 
have taken a more pragmatic approach to the purposes underlying the 
 
223 Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 7, at 2. 
224 Id. Gulliver and Tilson’s ideal testamentary world is similar, in some respects, to 
Professor Coase’s ideal economic world. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. 
& ECON. 1 (1960). Professor Coase’s ideal world envisions no transaction costs when 
transferring property rights. R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 14–15 
(1988). Gulliver and Tilson’s ideal testamentary world is one where there are no 
transaction costs associated with giving effect to a decedent’s testamentary intent. While 
both worlds are conceivable and desirable as a theoretical matter, neither is possible as a 
practical matter. 
225 Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey 
from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 119–20 (1998); John H. 
Turner, The U.S. EPA 40 C.F.R. Part 258 Financial Test/Corporate Guarantee—New 
Environmentally Protective, Cost-Effective Mechanisms for the Demonstration of 
Financial Responsibility, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 567, 615 (1998). The U.S. Supreme 
Court has acknowledged as much when it stated in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 
487 (1970): “the Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state officials 
charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among 
the myriad of potential recipients.” 
226 See, e.g., Horton, supra note 7, at 574 (“The idea that the Wills Act formalities 
prevent negative externalities is not entirely novel. One can catch glimmers of it in three 
places. First, some commentators have observed that the evidentiary and channeling 
propensities of the ‘writing’ and ‘signature’ elements limit the burden on courts . . . . 
Second, concern about the burden on the judicial system has also surfaced during the 
debate over the harmless error rule . . . . Third, judges and academics sometimes claim that 
strict compliance furthers the interests of decedents as a class.”). 
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Wills Act formalities. In contrast to the evidentiary, cautionary, and 
protective functions,227 the courts and many scholars tend to talk 
more in terms of testator’s intent,228 costs of administration,229 and 
the potential for fraud and/or other third party misconduct.230 Time of 
 
227 Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 7, at 2−3. 
228 See, e.g., Feinberg v. Feinberg (In re Estate of Feinberg), 919 N.E.2d 888, 895–96 
(Ill. 2009); Matter of Am. Comm. for the Weizmann Inst. of Sci. v. Dunn, 883 N.E.2d 996, 
1002 (N.Y. 2008) (where the Court of Appeals of New York acknowledged “the well-
settled precept that ‘[t]he . . . freedom of testation is a jealously guarded right . . . .’”); In re 
Estate of Malloy, 949 P.2d 804, 806–07 (Wash. 1998); see also Daniel B. Kelly, 
Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1125, 1133–38 (2013) (referring to testamentary freedom as the “organizing 
principle” of American succession law). 
229 See Estate of Heigho, 186 Cal. App. 2d 360, 367–68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960) (“It is the 
public policy of this state that there be an efficient administration and prompt settlement of 
estates not only for the sake of creditors but also for the benefit of heirs and 
beneficiaries.”); Rex v. Tovrea (In re Estate of Wiltfong), 148 P.3d 465, 467 (Colo. App. 
2006) (emphasis added) (“The underlying purposes of the Colorado Probate Code (Code) 
are to simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents; to discover and 
make effective the intent of decedents in distributing their property; and to promote a 
speedy and efficient system for settling estates of decedents and distributing their property 
to their successors.”); Quinn v. Quinn, 772 P.2d 979, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(acknowledging that one of the underlying purposes and policies of the Utah Uniform 
Probate Code is to promote “‘a speedy and efficient system for administering the estate of 
the decedent and making distribution to his successors.’”); Shipp, supra note 5, at 753 
(emphasis added) (“The routine application of the exacting standards of the Wills Act 
formalities to all wills submitted for probate provides a simple and efficient practice for 
treating wills. Indeed, this practice has existed for centuries . . . .”); Horton, supra note 7 
and accompanying text; Mann, supra note 167, at 1048 (emphasis added) (“The formal 
requirements for wills enable probate to function as an administrative process rather than a 
judicial one in the crucial initial determination of whether or not a writing is a will. They 
impose a standard form on testamentary writings that, for the vast majority of documents 
that comply with it, relieves probate of the time-consuming and administratively 
inefficient burden of conducting an individual inquiry into the substantive issue of whether 
the decedent intended the document to be a will. Because ‘substantively rational processes 
are disorderly,’ the massive volume of probate business and the inferior status of probate 
courts make such routinization essential.”); Miller, supra note 2, at 288 (acknowledging 
the tension between Gulliver and Tilson’s functional approach with its focus on testator’s 
intent and “the efficient functioning of the implementing courts”). 
230 See, e.g., McKee v. McKee’s Ex’r, 160 S.W. 261, 264 (Ky. 1913) (“It is a solemn 
thing to dispose of one’s property by will, especially on a deathbed, and the legislative 
purpose as clearly evidenced by this statute was to require it to be done in such way as to 
eliminate, as far as human laws can, all possibility of fraud, deception, or imposition.”); In 
re Noyes’ Estate, 105 P. 1013, 1016 (Mont. 1909) (“The purpose of the formalities 
prescribed is to prevent simulated and fraudulent writings from being probated and used as 
genuine. While the application of the strict rule of construction may sometimes defeat the 
intention of the testator as manifested by an imperfectly executed and authenticated 
writing, yet in the long run such statutes tend to promote justice, by lessening, so far as 
possible, the opportunity for fraud, which history and experience have demonstrated to be 
feasible and measurably safe in the absence of them . . . . The courts may not, therefore, 
out of regard for the supposed intention of the testator, however clearly it may be 
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death transfers, particularly those executed by elderly testators, 
intuitively present an increased risk of fraud, duress, and/or undue 
influence.231 Moreover, because the transferor is dead when the gift is 
given effect, the transferor is not able to express to the court the 
transferor’s true intent with respect to who is to take what.232 
Whatever safeguards one tries to build into the transfer process, the 
risk of misconduct by third parties with respect to a time of death 
transfer is greater than the risk of third party misconduct with respect 
to an inter vivos transfer. And while there are legal doctrines that 
specifically address these concerns—e.g., fraud, undue influence, 
 
manifested by the attendant circumstances, adopt a rule which would open the way for the 
same frauds which the statute was designed to prevent. The restrictions made by it are 
reasonable and easily understood, and, as experience has shown, it is far safer for society 
that a rule be adopted that requires a strict compliance with them, and, as a consequence, 
that occasionally an honest attempt to execute a will be defeated, than that the protections 
thus thrown about the testator should be disregarded because of an undue respect for his 
intentions, and way be left open the for the multitude of frauds and perjuries which would 
result.”); Meyer Estate, 42 Pa. D. & C.2d 295, 302 (C.P. 1967) (“Section 2 of the Wills 
Act of 1947 . . . must be strictly applied. The reason for this strict application of the act is 
to prevent the possibility of fraud . . . .”); In re Estate of Haugk, 280 N.W.2d 684, 690 
(Wis. 1979) (emphasis added) (“Again, it is the clear intent of the will execution statute 
and the construing case law to prevent the fraudulent manipulation of a testator’s estate.     
. . . To hold otherwise would open the door to enumerable cases of fraud.”); Horton, supra 
note 7 and accompanying text. 
231 McKee, 160 S.W. at 264 (“Many persons wait until their last days—even hours–to 
make wills; they are frequently then weak and debilitated. At such times, they are usually 
surrounded by persons who are interested in the disposition of their property. Under such 
conditions opportunity for fraud or deception is frequently presented, and the incentive for 
its perpetration is great. Manifestly the Legislature had these things in mind when it laid 
down these strict rules for the execution of wills, and clearly it would be unwise for the 
courts to relax them.”); James H. Pietsch & Margaret Hall, “Elder Law” and Conflicts of 
Interest in the United States and Canada, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1191, 1196–97 (2013) 
(“[I]t is indisputable that some people—including some lawyers—take advantage of 
individuals who may not retain the ability to protect themselves due to diminished mental 
or physical capacity and who may be more vulnerable due to their reliance on others for 
their care.”). See generally, Katherine Mann, J.D., in consultation with Gary W. Steinke, 
M.D., Alzheimer’s and Multi-Infarct Dementia−Incapacity to Execute Will, 17 AM. JUR. 
PROOF OF FACTS 3D 219, § 1 (2016). 
232 Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 705 So. 2d 724 (La. 1997) (discussing the 
potential for fraudulent claims of paternity, and noting, “the state’s interest in the orderly 
disposition of property at death because of the danger of fraud and the inability of the 
opponents to present evidence which might be available to the alleged parent if he were 
alive”); Teague D. Devitt, P.O.D.s May Thwart Testators’ Intent: It’s What Mom Wanted, 
86 WIS. L. REV. 24, 26 (2013) (“[G]iven that disputes over what a testator actually 
intended nearly always take place after the testator’s death, Sensenbrenner’s focus on the 
testator’s intentions, and the reasons underlying those intentions, can become blurry in 
practice. How, after all, is one to accurately assess a testator’s true intent and underlying 
rationale when one can no longer ask the testator herself?”). 
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duress—if any of these doctrines have to be asserted and proved, that 
only further increases costs of administration. Hence the traditional 
common law view that one of the public policy considerations 
underlying the Wills Act formalities was to prevent the potential for 
fraud and other misconduct.233 
2. Balancing the Competing Public Policy Considerations 
The challenge in creating and applying a Wills Act is how to 
balance the competing public policy considerations of testator’s 
intent, costs of administration, and potential for misconduct. If 
decedent’s intent and testamentary freedom were the sole public 
policy concerns, a court would hold a hearing either prior to or 
immediately following a person’s death to determine the person’s 
testamentary wishes,234 whether the person died testate or intestate.235 
The court would consider extrinsic evidence to determine the person’s 
intent at time of death regardless of the presence or terms of a will.236 
So long as there is clear and convincing evidence of the decedent’s 
intent, in theory, it should be given effect. Such a procedure, however, 
“does not correspond with existing mores and would be entirely 
impracticable in our present society for various rather obvious 
reasons.”237 The costs of administration would be prohibitive, and the 
potential for fraud would be unacceptably high.238 Creating a 
 
233 See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 7. 
234 See Horton, supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
235 The harmless error doctrine provides that one should give effect to a noncomplying 
document so long as there is clear and convincing evidence that the document expresses 
the decedent’s testamentary intent. The modern trend intent-based approach also grants the 
courts the power to reform a will to express the decedent’s true intent any time there is 
clear and convincing evidence of a mistake and clear and convincing evidence of its effect 
on testator’s intent. Accordingly, one could argue that in the absence of transaction costs a 
court should be willing to give effect to a decedent’s intent whenever there is clear and 
convincing evidence of such intent, whether the decedent dies testate or intestate. The 
intestate scheme is nothing more than the default will the state provides for a decedent in 
the absence of the decedent opting out of intestate scheme. To the extent the intent-based 
movement is open to reforming a lawyer drafted will to promote testator’s intent, likewise 
the intent-based movement should—in theory—be open to reforming the intestate scheme 
to promote the decedent’s intent. Such an approach, while theoretically intriguing, is 
clearly unworkable. 
236 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (2010) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 215 (2013 & 
Supp. 2014)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 12.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1999). 
237 See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
238 The wisdom of an approach that over-focuses on intent is called into question when 
one examines California’s history with the law of transmutation. California is a 
community property state. CAL. CIV. PRAC. FAMILY LAW LITIGATION § 5:1 (2016). 
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Property acquired before marriage remains separate property following marriage, and 
property which is acquired by gift, is a spouse’s separate property. CAL. FAM. CODE § 770 
(2017). Property acquired during marriage as a result of the labor of either spouse is 
community property. Id. § 760. Separate property is owned solely by the spouse who 
acquired the property. Community property is owned by the community, which means that 
it is owned equally by the spouses. Id. § 751. Each spouse has an undivided equal interest 
in the property. Transmutation is the law that governs a spouse’s changing the 
characterization of his or her property relative to the other spouse. A transmutation occurs 
(1) when one spouse transfers his or her separate property to (a) community property, or 
(b) the other spouse’s separate property, or (2) when a spouse transfers his or her 
community property to the other spouse, making the property in question the other 
spouse’s separate property. Id. § 850. 
 Inasmuch as transmutation is a transfer of property between spouses, Gulliver and 
Tilson’s admonishment about intent versus the formalities arguably applies just as well to 
the law of transmutation as it does the law of wills: 
One fundamental proposition is that, under a legal system recognizing the 
individualistic institution of private property and granting to the owner the power 
to determine his successors in ownership, the general philosophy of the courts 
should favor giving effect to an intentional exercise of that power . . . . If this 
objective is primary, the requirements of execution, which concern only the form 
of the transfer—what the transferor or others must do to make it legally 
effective—seem justifiable only as implements for its accomplishment, and 
should be so interpreted by the courts in these cases. They surely should not be 
revered as ends in themselves, enthroning formality over frustrated intent. 
Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 7, at 2–3. 
 Historically the California courts adopted and applied that approach to the issue of 
transmutation between spouses. The approach was known as the rule—and era—of easy 
transmutation. In re Marriage of Benson, 116 P.3d 1152, 1158 (Cal. 2005). The courts 
focused on each spouse’s intent, and intent trumped the formalities. In re Marriage of 
Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 255 (1972). Transmutations of real property could occur 
orally so long as the court was convinced the spouse intended to transfer the property 
interest even if there was no writing. In re Marriage of Milse, 227 Cal. Rptr. 70, 71 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1986) (citing Tomaier v. Tomaier, 146 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1944)). The courts held 
hearings to ascertain and give effect to each spouse’s claimed intent. Id. 
 With time, however, the courts came to realize that intent was not the sole or paramount 
public policy. In the absence of a writing requirement, the issue of a spouse’s intent 
becomes extremely fact-sensitive. The rule of easy transmutation “generated extensive 
litigation . . . .” In re Marriage of Benson, 116 P.3d 1152, 1158 (Cal. 2005). The rule of 
easy transmutation generated an increased number of fraudulent claims. Estate of 
MacDonald, 794 P.2d 911, 921−22 (Cal. 1990). While intent is important, so too are costs 
of administration and the potential for fraud or misconduct. 
 In response to the increased costs of administration and risk of fraudulent claims, and on 
the recommendation of the California Law Revision Commission, the California 
legislature enacted Civil Code Section 5110.730, which provides in pertinent part as 
follows: “A transmutation of real or personal property is not valid unless made in writing 
by an express declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse 
whose interest in the property is adversely affected.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110.730(a) 
(repealed and re-adopted as CAL. FAM. CODE § 852). 
 The California courts have been very strict in their interpretation of California’s hard 
transmutation statute. The courts have rejected claims that it is de facto nothing more than 
a statute of frauds and therefore should be subject to the usual exceptions and exemptions 
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presumed intent for each decedent (i.e., the intestate scheme), and 
then putting the burden on each individual to opt out of the presumed 
intent by properly expressing his or her intent, is a reasonable and 
more efficient approach.239 
The challenge then becomes what should be required before a 
society will recognize an individual’s intent to opt out of the default 
scheme. Professor Langbein’s substantial compliance/harmless error 
approach focuses on “individual justice”240 and implicitly adopts the 
view that once the testator puts his or her testamentary wishes in 
writing, the paramount public policy consideration is to give effect to 
that intent.241 Professor Langbein’s approach focuses solely on the 
outcome in a given case and fails to consider (1) whether the resulting 
precedent may encourage third parties to engage in future misconduct 
in the hope that they may be able to convince the court the latter case 
is indistinguishable from the prior case,242 and/or (2) whether the 
precedent established by the case before the court may result in 
increased future costs of administration because future testators may 
be more complacent in how they express their intent.243 In economic 
 
to the statute of frauds (including substantial compliance). See generally Kim M. Seavey, 
Formalizing Interspousal Transfers of Real and Personal Property in California, 30 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 425 (1993). The California Supreme Court has construed the statutory 
requirement of “an express declaration” as requiring “language which expressly states that 
the characterization or ownership of the property is being changed.” Estate of MacDonald, 
794 P.2d at 918. Where there is a writing but the express language is ambiguous, the 
courts have refused to admit extrinsic evidence to help resolve the ambiguity on the 
grounds that any other approach would “encourag[e] perjury and the proliferation of 
litigation.” Id. Intent, while important, is not the sole public policy consideration. Intent 
must be balanced against costs of administration and potential for fraud and other 
misconduct. 
239 See Daniel B. Kelly, Toward Economic Analysis of the Uniform Probate Code, 45 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 855, 866–67 (2012). See generally Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules 
in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031 
(2004). 
240 Langbein, supra note 9, at 523. 
241 Id. at 518, 523 (arguing that such cases should be permitted to be tried because of 
the “rare cases” where the persuasive evidence exists even where the decedent failed to 
sign the will, although Professor Langbein acknowledges that the likelihood that the 
document will meet the requirements of his substantial compliance proposal is very low—
so most cases involving such a scenario would be fruitless). 
242 See supra note 230; Kelly, supra note 239, at 881. 
243 See Mark Glover, The Therapeutic Function of Testamentary Formality, 61 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 139, 173–74 (2013) (“The adoption of the substantial compliance doctrine or the 
harmless error rule, however, could reduce the estate planning attorney’s role as a 
therapeutic agent for her client and diminish the ritualistic nature of the will-execution 
ceremony. Much like the effect of eliminating the attestation requirement, a rule of relaxed 
testamentary formalism could encourage testators to execute wills informally and without 
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terminology, Professor Langbein’s approach fails to take into account 
the negative externalities a precedent may create.244 
That, in essence, is what distinguishes the court-created flexible 
strict compliance from Professor Langbein’s holistic substantial 
compliance/harmless error approach. Judge Posner was the first to 
assert that common law judges are intuitive economists concerned 
with efficiency.245 The court-created flexible strict compliance 
approach rejects the holistic approach in favor of a more formality-
based or scenario-based approach.246 The courts ask whether the 
conduct in question sufficiently meets the purposes of the formality, 
not whether the document in question “sufficiently approximate[s] 
Wills Act formality to enable the court to conclude that it serves the 
purposes of the Wills Act.”247 In doing so, the court-created flexible 
strict compliance approach balances the competing public policy 
considerations of giving effect to testator’s intent while at the same 
 
the assistance of a lawyer. Because a formal defect would no longer automatically 
invalidate an attempted expression of testamentary intent, the harsh consequences of 
forgoing legal assistance would be reduced and consequently the testator’s incentive to 
consult an estate planning attorney would be diminished. The relaxation of testamentary 
formalism could also encourage the testator to abandon strict adherence to the formalities 
of will execution because simpler and cheaper methods of executing a will would be 
legally valid.”); see also Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary 
Intent: The Search for a Compromise Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 
CONN. L. REV. 453, 468 (2002) (“If it is generally understood that judges have the power 
to dispense with formality requirements . . . testators might come to believe that the 
statutory procedures are no longer necessary. Accordingly, they might gradually abandon 
traditional testamentary procedures in favor of other, perhaps cheaper, means of 
expressing testamentary intent.”); Kelly, supra note 241, at 878–79. But see Langbein, 
supra note 9, at 524 (arguing that relaxed testamentary formalism “would have no effect 
whatever upon primary conduct”). 
244 See Langbein, supra note 9, at 524 (claiming that substantial compliance “would 
have no effect whatever upon primary conduct”); Langbein, supra note 9, at 525 (claiming 
that substantial compliance “would actually decrease litigation about the formalities”); 
Bieber v. Bieber (In re Estate of Krueger), 529 N.W.2d 151, 154 (N.D. 1995) (emphasis 
added) (articulating a fear that “a precedent would be set which could open the door to 
forged and fraudulent documents being admitted as a decedent’s will”); see also Horton, 
supra note 7, at 577 (“[T]he need to prevent spillover costs—not the desire to carry out a 
decedent’s intent—furnishes the most forceful reasons to take the Wills Act at its letter.”). 
245 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 4 (1981); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 21 (3d ed. 1986); Nuno Garoupa & Carlos Gomez 
Liguerre, The Evolution of the Common Law and Efficiency, 40 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
307, 309 (2012). 
246 See supra notes 97–103, 110–19, 132–77 and accompanying text. 
247 See supra note 182 and accompanying text (emphasis added). 
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time minimizing costs of administration and the potential for fraud 
and/or other misconduct.248 
Each burden or Wills Act formality society imposes on a testator 
conflicts with the public policy of honoring the testator’s testamentary 
intent.249 The history of the law of wills is one of society placing a 
relatively high bar on the individual to opt out of intestacy and 
applying that bar stringently.250 The history of the law of wills is also 
that of the courts, in the best tradition of the common law, identifying 
scenarios where the requirements for expressing one’s testamentary 
intent could be applied more flexibly without significantly increasing 
administrative costs and/or the potential for fraud.251 In those 
scenarios, the courts have articulated a specific doctrine—i.e., the 
conscious presence doctrine—that either expressly or de facto took 
more of a substantial compliance approach to the formality.252 
By identifying scenarios where the bar to executing a valid will 
could be lowered (and/or applied more flexibly), the courts were 
adopting something of a situational approach to the Wills Act 
formalities253 that promotes testamentary intent, without significantly 
increasing costs of administration or the potential for 
fraud/misconduct. The courts were identifying particular scenarios 
where the marginal benefits associated with the substantial 
compliance approach exceeded the marginal costs, thereby justifying 
adoption of the court-created substantial compliance doctrine.254 Over 
 
248 Buried in a footnote, deep in his Substantial Compliance article, Professor Langbein 
admits as much but dismisses such an approach because it fails to adopt a purposive 
approach. Langbein, supra note 9, at 526 n.127. A flexible strict compliance advocate 
would counter that the courts are adopting a purposive approach, they just view the 
relevant public policy considerations differently from Professor Langbein’s functional 
approach. 
249 Glover, supra note 2, at 607; Glover, supra note 243, at 158; Gulliver & Tilson, 
supra note 7, at 2–3. 
250 See Brown, supra note 156, at 96–98; Langbein, supra note 9, at 490–92; Miller, 
supra note 2, at 200–05. 
251 Hence the term “flexible strict compliance.” See supra notes 97–103, 110–19, 132–
77 and accompanying text. 
252 See supra notes 97–103, 110–19, 132–77 and accompanying text. 
253 See generally Hirsch, supra note 219. 
254 Interestingly, while Professor Langbein fails to take marginal costs and marginal 
benefits into consideration, some legislatures have implicitly done so in adopting a 
modified/limited version of his harmless error proposal. A number of states, in adopting 
the harmless error doctrine statutorily, have expressly provided that the doctrine does not 
apply to the writing or signature requirement, only to the witnessing requirement and the 
formalities associated with it. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (2010) (amended 2010), 
8 U.L.A. 215 (2013 & Supp. 2014). In so limiting the harmless error doctrine the 
legislatures have implicitly concluded that marginal benefits to be derived from the limited 
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time the legislatures often agreed with the courts’ assessment of how 
best to balance the competing public policy consideration. Many of 
the early court-created substantial compliance doctrines have been 
codified in subsequent Wills Acts.255 
The court-created flexible strict compliance approach permits the 
courts to identify scenarios where the Wills Act can be improved, 
authorizes the courts to take the first shot at drafting the de facto 
revision to the Wills Act, and empowers the courts to define the scope 
of the amendment. This formality-by-formality-based approach lets 
the courts create sub-doctrines that improve the balance between 
promoting testamentary intent while at the same time minimizing 
costs of administration and potential for third party misconduct. 
Might—just might—this flexible strict compliance approach, this 
symbiotic legislative/judicial approach to Wills Act evolution, be 
more efficient and better than a statutorily mandated, across the 
board, holistic approach to substantial compliance/harmless error? 
Might that be why more jurisdictions have not adopted the harmless 
error doctrine? 
CONCLUSION 
He who phrases the issue usually wins the debate. 
Professor Langbein’s articles, particularly his Substantial 
Compliance article, imply that the only other option to his proposals 
is literal strict compliance.256 That is one way to view the state of the 
law of Wills Act compliance. Another, however, is to acknowledge 
and factor in the growing body of court-created substantial 
compliance doctrines.257 Recognizing the substantial and expanding 
body of case law that either expressly or de facto adopts a substantial 
compliance approach to the Wills Act formalities results in more of a 
spectrum-based view of the state of the law of Wills Act compliance. 
At one end of the spectrum is literal strict compliance, at the other end 
are Professor Langbein’s substantial compliance/harmless error 
 
number of additional wills that might be probated under a broad harmless error doctrine 
that applied to the signature requirement are not worth the increased marginal costs of 
administration and the increased potential for fraud or other third party misconduct that 
would likely accompany such a broad approach to the harmless error doctrine. 
255 See supra notes 97–103, 110–19, 132–77 and accompanying text; see also 
Langbein, supra note 9, at 510. 
256 Langbein, supra note 9, at 489, 526; Langbein, supra note 13, at 1–6. 
257 See supra notes 97–103, 110–19, 132–77 and accompanying text. 
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proposals, and in between are those jurisdictions that apply strict 
compliance as their default approach, but which have adopted one or 
more court-created substantial compliance doctrines. Viewed from the 
spectrum-based approach, while there may be a handful of states at 
either end of the spectrum, the overwhelming majority of the states 
are somewhere in between. Most states have adopted one or more 
court-created substantial compliance doctrines. The more court-
created substantial compliance doctrines a jurisdiction has adopted, 
the closer it is to Professor Langbein’s end of the spectrum—and the 
less it fits Professor Langbein’s description of the law of Wills Act 
compliance as being harsh and relentless. 
Professor Langbein phrased the issue as which is better: traditional 
strict compliance or his substantial compliance/harmless error 
proposals. If presented with only these two options, a strong case can 
be made that Professor Langbein’s substantial compliance/harmless 
error proposals are better. The problem with that analysis, however, is 
that most states do not apply traditional strict compliance. Most 
jurisdictions have adopted some form of flexible strict compliance 
(depending on the number of court-created substantial compliance 
doctrines the jurisdiction has adopted). The issue then becomes 
whether the marginal benefits of Professor Langbein’s substantial 
compliance/harmless error proposals are worth the increased costs of 
administration and potential for fraud/misconduct inherent in those 
approaches. As compared to flexible strict compliance, how many 
more wills will be probated (admittedly more), but at what additional 
cost of administration and at what increased potential for fraud/other 
third party misconduct? Are the marginal benefits of the holistic 
approach to substantial compliance/harmless error greater than the 
marginal benefits associated with the formality based flexible strict 
compliance approach? The answer to that question is far from 
obvious. 
Now that the third option, flexible strict compliance, has been 
articulated, may the debate over which approach is best begin anew. 
 
